| dbo:abstract
|
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292 (1990), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held that undercover police agents did not need to give Miranda warnings when talking to suspects in jail. Miranda warnings, named after the 1966 Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, are generally required when police interrogate suspects in custody in order to protect the right not to self-incriminate and the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. However, the Court ruled that potential coercion must be evaluated from the suspect's point of view, and if they are unaware that they are speaking to police, they are not under the coercive pressure of a normal interrogation. (en)
|
| dbo:wikiPageExternalLink
| |
| dbo:wikiPageID
| |
| dbo:wikiPageLength
|
- 12000 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger)
|
| dbo:wikiPageRevisionID
| |
| dbo:wikiPageWikiLink
| |
| dbp:arguedate
|
- 0001-02-20 (xsd:gMonthDay)
|
| dbp:argueyear
| |
| dbp:concurrence
| |
| dbp:decidedate
|
- 0001-06-04 (xsd:gMonthDay)
|
| dbp:decideyear
| |
| dbp:dissent
| |
| dbp:docket
| |
| dbp:holding
|
- Statements made by an incarcerated suspect to an undercover police agent are admissible as evidence, notwithstanding that the suspect was not given a Miranda warning, when the suspect did not know they were speaking to the police. (en)
|
| dbp:joinmajority
|
- Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia (en)
|
| dbp:lawsapplied
| |
| dbp:litigants
| |
| dbp:majority
| |
| dbp:oralargument
| |
| dbp:prior
| |
| dbp:scotus
| |
| dbp:source
|
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US at 297 (en)
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US at 302 (en)
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US at 307 (en)
|
| dbp:subsequent
| |
| dbp:text
|
- The method used to elicit the confession in this case deserves close scrutiny . . . We have recognized that "the mere fact of custody imposes pressures on the accused; confinement may bring into play subtle influences that will make him particularly susceptible to the ploys of undercover Government agents." United States v. Henry, 447 U. S. 264, 274 . As Justice Marshall points out, the pressures of custody make a suspect more likely to confide in others and to engage in "jailhouse bravado." The State is in a unique position to exploit this vulnerability because it has virtually complete control over the suspect's environment. Thus, the State can ensure that a suspect is barraged with questions from an undercover agent until the suspect confesses. (en)
- Questioning by captors, who appear to control the suspect's fate, may create mutually reinforcing pressures that the Court has assumed will weaken the suspect's will, but where a suspect does not know that he is conversing with a government agent, these pressures do not exist. The state court here mistakenly assumed that because the suspect was in custody, no undercover questioning could take place. When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners. (en)
- Custody works to the State's advantage in obtaining incriminating information. The psychological pressures inherent in confinement increase the suspect's anxiety, making him likely to seek relief by talking with others. . . Similarly, where the suspect is incarcerated, the constant threat of physical danger peculiar to the prison environment may make him demonstrate his toughness to other inmates by recounting or inventing past violent acts. (en)
|
| dbp:uspage
| |
| dbp:usvol
| |
| dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate
| |
| dcterms:subject
| |
| rdf:type
| |
| rdfs:comment
|
- Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292 (1990), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held that undercover police agents did not need to give Miranda warnings when talking to suspects in jail. Miranda warnings, named after the 1966 Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, are generally required when police interrogate suspects in custody in order to protect the right not to self-incriminate and the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. However, the Court ruled that potential coercion must be evaluated from the suspect's point of view, and if they are unaware that they are speaking to police, they are not under the coercive pressure of a normal interrogation. (en)
|
| rdfs:label
| |
| owl:sameAs
| |
| prov:wasDerivedFrom
| |
| foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf
| |
| is dbo:wikiPageRedirects
of | |
| is dbo:wikiPageWikiLink
of | |
| is foaf:primaryTopic
of | |
