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- Rick Thaler, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division v. Anthony Cardell Haynes (en)
- John Robertson v. United States ex rel. Wykenna Watson (en)
- David Bobby, Warden v. Robert J. Van Hook (en)
- Demarcus Ali Sears v. Stephen Upton, Warden (en)
- E.K. McDaniel, Warden, et al. v. Troy Brown (en)
- Eric Presley v. Georgia (en)
- Jamie Wilkins v. Officer Gaddy (en)
- Lawrence Joseph Jefferson v. Stephen Upton, Warden (en)
- Marcus A. Wellons v. Hilton Hall, Warden (en)
- Michigan v. Jeremy Fisher (en)
- Robert Wong, Warden v. Fernando Belmontes, Jr. (en)
- George Porter, Jr. v. Bill McCollum, Attorney General of Florida, et al. (en)
- Dennis Hollingsworth, et al. v. Kristin M. Perry, et al (en)
- Jamal Kiyemba et al. v. Barack Obama, President of the United States et al. (en)
- Joseph E. Corcoran v. Mark Levenhagen, Superintendent, Indiana State Prison (en)
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| dbp:summary
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- 5.680368E8
- Court of Appeals of Michigan reversed and remanded.
Jeremy Fisher was charged under Michigan law with assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, namely pointing a long gun at a police officer who was opening Fisher's front door to enter without a warrant. The trial court suppressed the officer's statement on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Michigan Court of Appeals remanded for an evidentiary hearing, and the trial court reinstated its order to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court initially granted and then denied leave to appeal.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the officer's attempted entry was a reasonable exception to the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches.
Stevens filed a dissent, joined by Sotomayor. (en)
- Application for stay granted.
Breyer filed a dissent, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. (en)
- Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Thomas filed a concurrence, joined by Scalia. (en)
- Supreme Court of Georgia vacated and remanded.
Having found Demarcus Ali Sears guilty of a capital crime, a Georgia court sentenced him to death despite several mitigating circumstances, including a severe cognitive impairment and an abusive childhood. Most of these mitigating circumstances were never brought out by the defense attorney during the sentencing phase of the trial. A lower court ruled that the Sears' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, failed the two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington. The two parts of the test are to show that the defense was inadequate and to show that this prejudiced the outcome of the trial. The lower court ruled that although the defense attorney clearly provided an inadequate defense, there was no way to know – without speculation – whether that might have prejudiced the sentencing phase of the trial.
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the lower court and required them to reconsider the claim. Proper application of the prejudice test of Strickland v. Washington "requires precisely the type of probing and fact-specific analysis that the state trial court failed to undertake." Courts must undertake a point-by-point investigation of the deficiencies in the defense and reweigh the likely outcome. Courts may not perform a cursory analysis and claim that there is no way to know how the inadequate defense might have affected the outcome of the trial.
Roberts and Alito noted without separate opinion that they would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari. Scalia filed a dissent, joined by Thomas. (en)
- Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court reversed the death sentence of a Korean War veteran who suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, ruling that his defense attorney's failure to uncover or present any mitigating evidence regarding his military service or his mental health deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Porter was convicted in 1987 of murdering his ex-girlfriend and her boyfriend in Melbourne, Florida. He represented himself at trial, but eventually pleaded guilty and then was represented by a court-appointed attorney during the penalty phase. That attorney failed to uncover or present any evidence of Porter's mental health, his family background, or his military service. The sum total of the mitigating evidence presented was instead inconsistent testimony about Porter's behavior when intoxicated and testimony that Porter had a good relationship with his son. The jury recommended a sentence of death.
Porter filed a postconviction petition in 1995. The reviewing state trial court conducted a 2-day evidentiary hearing, during which Porter presented extensive mitigating evidence that was apparently unknown to his penalty-phase attorney. His siblings testified to the physical abuse Porter suffered from their father and witnessed towards his mother. Porter enlisted in the Army at age 17 to fight in the Korean War, and his company commander testified at the hearing regarding his service. Porter fought in the brutal battles of Kunuri and Chipyong, was wounded twice, and earned medals for his service.
The trial court denied his postconviction petition, not reaching the issue of whether his attorney's performance was deficient, but finding that the failure to present this evidence did not prejudice Porter at trial. It discounted the evidence of his military service in light of his AWOL periods. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed. Porter next filed a petition for habeas relief in federal court. The District Court granted his petition, granting him a new sentencing hearing. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, in deference to the state court's judgment.
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the decision of Porter's attorney not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.
Regarding the second prong of the Strickland test, whether that deficiency prejudiced the results of Porter's trial, the judge and jury at Porter’s original sentencing heard almost nothing that would humanize Porter or allow them to accurately gauge his moral culpability. (en)
- Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded.
The petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in state court. He filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that his sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. The District Court granted his petition on that basis alone and ordered the defendant to be resentenced, and did not discuss his other claims as it considered those moot. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court and directed it upon remand to deny the habeas writ, without permitting the District Court to review the other claims, and without explaining why those claims should not be considered.
The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's decision, explaining that it was error for that court to dispose of the petitioner's other claims without any explanation. The Seventh Circuit was to either permit the District Court to consider the unaddressed claims on remand, or itself explain why that consideration was not necessary. (en)
- Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded.
Lawrence Jefferson was sentenced to death for a capital crime. He subsequently argued in state and then federal court that his lawyers had been constitutionally inadequate because they failed to investigate a traumatic head injury he sustained as a child. This injury may have caused abnormal behavior leading to limited or no impulse control.
In state court his lawyers explained that they did not pursue testing of the head injury because the case mental health expert had told them verbally that further testing was a waste of time. This explanation is disputed by the expert himself. The state court held that the defense lawyers made a reasonable investigation into his mental health and thus Jefferson's claim was rejected.
Under federal law, facts found by the state must be presumed correct, unless any of eight criteria are met, as outlined in Townsend v. Sain. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the ruling of the state court because they were "duty bound" to accept their factual findings.
The Supreme Court found that the federal court incorrectly upheld the decision of the state court because they failed to consider seven of the eight criteria. The case was remanded back to the federal court to reconsider whether or not to accept the factual evidence found by the state by applying all eight criteria.
Scalia filed a dissent, joined by Thomas. (en)
- The Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
Roberts filed a dissent, joined by Scalia, Kennedy, and Sotomayor. Sotomayor filed a dissent, joined by Kennedy, to clarify her understanding of the rule the Chief Justice proposed in his opinion. (en)
- Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded.
Thomas filed a dissent, joined by Scalia. (en)
- Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
The Court had originally granted certiorari and scheduled the case for argument, but then removed it from the calendar and decided it purely on the briefs.
Thomas filed a concurrence, joined by Scalia. (en)
- Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Anthony Cardell Haynes was tried in a Texas court after the murder of a police officer. (en)
- District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded.
Twenty-two members of a Chinese ethnic minority called Uighurs were captured by U.S. forces at a terrorist training camp shortly after the beginning of the Afghanistan War. They were imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay detention camp despite the fact that they were not designated enemy combatants. U.S. law prevents them from being released back to China because, as terrorists, they would be tortured or executed.
The Uighars challenged their detention on the basis of habeas corpus, demanding their freedom even if it meant releasing them into the U.S. Meanwhile, the detainees have received at least one offer of resettlement in another country. All but five have accepted those offers. The remaining five have in fact rejected two such offers.
No court had yet ruled on this case in light of the offers of resettlement. Therefore the Supreme Court declined to rule on the question of whether a federal court has the right to release the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay. "We are a court of review, not of first view." (en)
- Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded.
Scalia filed a dissent, joined by Thomas. Alito filed a dissent, joined by Roberts. (en)
- Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.
For the third time, the Supreme Court set aside the Ninth Circuit's reversal of a death sentence in a California murder case. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, failed the two-prong test under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , because he could not establish that prejudice resulted even if his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient.
In 1981, Belmontes broke into a woman's home in Victor, California, and bludgeoned her to death, repeatedly striking her in the head with a steel bar. He and his accomplices then stole the victim's stereo, sold it for $100, and used the money to buy beer and drugs for the night. Belmontes was convicted of murder in state court in 1982. During the sentencing phase, his defense attorney successfully excluded evidence he had committed another murder, for which he had served time only as an accessory, though the court warned that the prior murder could be admissible as rebuttal evidence if the defense made it an issue. Constrained by that limit, the defense attorney nevertheless presented several witnesses, and testimony from Belmontes himself, regarding the abuse he suffered as a child, and his religious conversion while in jail on the accessory charge. The jury returned a sentence of death.
The District Court denied Belmontes' petition for habeas relief, and the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding error in the jury's instructions. The Supreme Court summarily vacated that decision and remanded for reconsideration in light of Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 . On remand, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its decision, and the Supreme Court reversed in Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 . On remand, the Ninth Circuit again granted Belmontes relief, this time on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of his trial.
In Wong v. Belmontes, the Supreme Court again reversed, holding that Belmontes failed to establish the showing of prejudice required by Strickland, regardless of whether his attorney's performance was constitutionally deficient. The Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for changing its view of the case; the same panel of judges that characterized the mitigation evidence presented as merely "cursory" in its most recent opinion had characterized the same evidence as "substantial" in its first opinion. Though the Ninth Circuit ruled that Belmontes was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to present even more evidence to "humanize" him, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that such evidence would either be merely cumulative, or would have opened the door for the admissibility of evidence of the prior murder. The Supreme Court dismissed as "fanciful" the notion that the jury's result could have been different if only the defense attorney had called more witnesses, in light of the circumstances of the murder. The Supreme Court took particular issue with the Ninth Circuit's assertion that the case did not involve "needless suffering", given that the motive for the murder was petty burglary, and the victim had been beaten 15-20 times on the head, suffered defensive wounds that indicated a struggle, and remained alive in that state until shortly after police found her.
Stevens filed a concurrence. He criticized the Supreme Court's prior decision, from which he had dissented, and stated that he strongly disagreed with the decision to review the case again. Stevens agreed, however, with the Court's present conclusion that the failure to present additional mitigating evidence probably did not affect the outcome. (en)
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