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Statements

Subject Item
dbr:Decentralized_Privacy-Preserving_Proximity_Tracing
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DP-3T Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing Rastreo de proximidad descentralizado para preservar la privacidad Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing Sécurité et respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19
rdfs:comment
Decentralized-Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracking (DP-3T, stilizzata come ) è un protocollo open-source sviluppato in risposta alla pandemia di COVID-19 per facilitare la tracciatura dei contatti avuti dai partecipanti infetti. Il protocollo, come anche il protocollo Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), utilizza Bluetooth Low Energy per tenere traccia e registrare gli incontri con altri utenti. I protocolli differiscono nel loro meccanismo di reportistica: PEPP-PT richiede ai client di caricare i log dei contatti su un server di report centrale e mentre su DP-3T il server di reporting centrale non ha mai accesso ai log di contatti né è responsabile dell'elaborazione e della comunicazione ai client dei contatti avvenuti. Poiché i registri dei contatti non vengono Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T, ditulis sebagai dp3t, bahasa Indonesia: Penelusuran Kedekatan Terdesentralisasi dengan Penjagaan Privasi) adalah protokol terbuka yang dikembangkan sebagai tindak lanjut dari pandemi COVID-19 dan sebagai sarana penelusuran kontak digital terhadap para pengidap. Protokol ini, seperti protokol saingannya, Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), memakai Bluetooth energi rendah untuk melacak dan mencatat pertemuan dengan pengguna lain. La sécurité et le respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19 sont nécessaires pour que les utilisateurs aient confiance et les adoptent largement. Les applications de traçage des contacts au Covid-19 permettent d'identifier des personnes susceptibles d'avoir contracté le Covid-19 et d'obtenir des informations supplémentaires utiles à la compréhension de la propagation du virus. Les applications récupèrent ainsi des informations confidentielles sur ses utilisateurs, et divers protocoles sont alors mis en place pour anonymiser les individus et protéger la vie privée de ses usagés. Parmi ces protocoles, la collecte des données collectées différera avec GPS ou Bluetooth, et le traitement des données se réalisera soit sur le serveur (protocole dit centralisé), soit sur le téléphone (pro Rastreo de proximidad descentralizado para preservar la privacidad (DP-3T, estilizado como ) es un protocolo de código abierto ​ desarrollado en respuesta a la pandemia de coronavirus 2019-2020 para facilitar el rastreo de contactos digitales de los participantes infectados. ​ El protocolo, como el protocolo de competencia Pan-European Privacy-Preserve Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), utiliza Bluetooth Low Energy para rastrear y registrar encuentros con otros usuarios. ​ ​ ​ Los protocolos difieren en su mecanismo de informes, ya que PEPP-PT requiere que los clientes carguen registros de contactos a un servidor central, mientras que con DP-3T, el servidor central nunca tiene acceso a los registros de contactos ni es responsable de procesar e informar a los clientes del contacto. Debido a que Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T, stylized as dp3t) is an open protocol developed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to facilitate digital contact tracing of infected participants. The protocol, like competing protocol Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), uses Bluetooth Low Energy to track and log encounters with other users. The protocols differ in their reporting mechanism, with PEPP-PT requiring clients to upload contact logs to a central reporting server, whereas with DP-3T, the central reporting server never has access to contact logs nor is it responsible for processing and informing clients of contact. Because contact logs are never transmitted to third parties, it has major privacy benefits over the PEPP-PT approach; however, this
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n6:_Apple_contact_tracing_project dbr:SHA-2 dbr:ISI_Foundation dbr:Helmholtz_Association_of_German_Research_Centres dbr:Federal_Office_of_Public_Health dbr:École_Polytechnique_Fédérale_de_Lausanne dbr:Open_protocol dbr:Netherlands dbr:Croatia dbr:Delft_University_of_Technology dbr:University_of_Torino dbr:Portugal dbr:Digital_contact_tracing dbr:University_College_London dbr:Estonia dbr:Finland dbr:Italy dbr:Private_data dbc:Digital_contact_tracing_protocols dbr:Belgium dbr:Austrian_Red_Cross dbr:Switzerland dbr:Pan-European_Privacy-Preserving_Proximity_Tracing dbr:Huawei dbr:Ed25519 dbr:Exposure_Notification dbr:SAP_SE dbr:HMAC-SHA256 dbr:Germany dbr:COVID-19_pandemic dbr:BlueTrace dbr:TCN_Protocol dbc:COVID-19_pandemic_in_Europe dbr:Serge_Vaudenay dbc:Software_using_the_Mozilla_license dbr:Ireland dbr:Deutsche_Telekom dbr:Bluetooth_Low_Energy dbr:Epidemiology dbr:Timestamp dbc:Digital_contact_tracing_protocols_with_decentralized_reporting n22:DP-3T_Ephemeral_ID.svg dbr:ETH_Zurich dbc:Computer-related_introductions_in_2020 dbc:Application_layer_protocols dbr:KU_Leuven dbc:Software_using_the_MPL_license dbc:Software_associated_with_the_COVID-19_pandemic dbr:INESC_TEC dbc:Software_using_the_Apache_license dbr:HTTPS dbr:Austria
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Android & iOS smartphones
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~
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Serge Vaudenay
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some privacy protection measurements by DP3T may have the opposite affect of what they were intended to. Specifically, sick and reported people may be deanonymized, private encounters may be revealed, and people may be coerced to reveal the private data they collect. By comparing centralized and decentralized architectures, we observe that attacks against decentralized systems are undetectable, can be done at a wide scale, and that the proposed countermeasures are, at best, able to mitigate attacks in a limited number of scenarios. Contrarily, centralized systems offer many countermeasures, by accounting and auditing.
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Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T, ditulis sebagai dp3t, bahasa Indonesia: Penelusuran Kedekatan Terdesentralisasi dengan Penjagaan Privasi) adalah protokol terbuka yang dikembangkan sebagai tindak lanjut dari pandemi COVID-19 dan sebagai sarana penelusuran kontak digital terhadap para pengidap. Protokol ini, seperti protokol saingannya, Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), memakai Bluetooth energi rendah untuk melacak dan mencatat pertemuan dengan pengguna lain. Protokol-protokol tersebut berbeda dalam tata cara pelaporannya. PEPP-PT mengharuskan klien mengunggah catatan kontak ke server pelaporan pusat, sedangkan DP-3T mengatur agar server pelaporan pusat tidak punya akses ke catatan kontak serta tidak bertanggung jawab terhadap pengolahan kontak dan pemberitahuan kepada pengguna. Karena catatan kontak tidak pernah dikirimkan kepada pihak ketiga, protokol ini memiliki keuntungan privasi dibanding pendekatan PEPP-PT. Namun, hal tersebut membutuhkan daya lebih pada klien untuk mengolah laporan infeksi. Rastreo de proximidad descentralizado para preservar la privacidad (DP-3T, estilizado como ) es un protocolo de código abierto ​ desarrollado en respuesta a la pandemia de coronavirus 2019-2020 para facilitar el rastreo de contactos digitales de los participantes infectados. ​ El protocolo, como el protocolo de competencia Pan-European Privacy-Preserve Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), utiliza Bluetooth Low Energy para rastrear y registrar encuentros con otros usuarios. ​ ​ ​ Los protocolos difieren en su mecanismo de informes, ya que PEPP-PT requiere que los clientes carguen registros de contactos a un servidor central, mientras que con DP-3T, el servidor central nunca tiene acceso a los registros de contactos ni es responsable de procesar e informar a los clientes del contacto. Debido a que los registros de contactos nunca se transmiten a terceros, tiene importantes beneficios de privacidad sobre el enfoque PEPP-PT, ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ sin embargo, esto tiene la desventaja de requerir más potencia informática en el lado del cliente para procesar informes de infección. ​ El 21 de abril de 2020, la Oficina Federal Suiza de Salud Pública anunció que la aplicación de rastreo de contactos de coronavirus nacional suizo se basará en DP-3T. ​ Existe un proyecto, Exposure Notification, de Apple y Google basado en principios similares a los del protocolo DP-3T, utilizando la tecnología Bluetooth para determinar la distancia entre dos dispositivos. ​​ Por otro lado, Huawei añadió una implementación similar al protocolo DP-3T a sus APIs de servicios móviles llamada “Contact Shield” en junio de 2020, utilizando también la tecnología Bluetooth con el mismo objetivo e intercambiando información con los dispositivos detectados, recogiendo la información anónimamente de los usuarios detectados. ​ El SDK de DP-3T y sus aplicaciones de calibración pretenden ser compatibles con la API de Apple/Google tan pronto como se lance para los dispositivos iOS y Android. ​​ Numerosos países como Estonia, La Cruz Roja Austriaca, y Finlandia (con su versión denominada “Ketju”) ya empezaron a utilizar el rastreo de proximidad a finales de abril.​​ Uniéndose posteriormente Alemania al construir una aplicación basada en el DP-3T por SAP SE y Deutsche Telekom junto con CISPA nos encontramos con que el 30 de septiembre de 2020 ya existen aplicaciones de rastreo de proximidad usando el protocolo DP-3T en Austria, Bélgica, Croacia, Alemania, Irlanda, Italia, los Países Bajos, Portugal y Suiza. ​​ En cuanto a España, el gobierno decidió también unirse a esta propuesta utilizando el sistema creado por Apple/Google.​ La sécurité et le respect de la vie privée des applications Covid-19 sont nécessaires pour que les utilisateurs aient confiance et les adoptent largement. Les applications de traçage des contacts au Covid-19 permettent d'identifier des personnes susceptibles d'avoir contracté le Covid-19 et d'obtenir des informations supplémentaires utiles à la compréhension de la propagation du virus. Les applications récupèrent ainsi des informations confidentielles sur ses utilisateurs, et divers protocoles sont alors mis en place pour anonymiser les individus et protéger la vie privée de ses usagés. Parmi ces protocoles, la collecte des données collectées différera avec GPS ou Bluetooth, et le traitement des données se réalisera soit sur le serveur (protocole dit centralisé), soit sur le téléphone (protocole dit décentralisé). Des attaques existent et auront divers buts comme la dés-anonymisation des utilisateurs, le traçage des individus ou la création de faux-positifs. Chaque protocole possède ainsi une meilleure défense selon un corpus d'attaques particulières et répondra à des enjeux différents. Les gouvernements de plusieurs pays ont alors adopté divers choix au sujet du protocole et de la législation qui l'entoure, entre autres en rendant l'application obligatoire ou non. Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T, stylized as dp3t) is an open protocol developed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic to facilitate digital contact tracing of infected participants. The protocol, like competing protocol Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), uses Bluetooth Low Energy to track and log encounters with other users. The protocols differ in their reporting mechanism, with PEPP-PT requiring clients to upload contact logs to a central reporting server, whereas with DP-3T, the central reporting server never has access to contact logs nor is it responsible for processing and informing clients of contact. Because contact logs are never transmitted to third parties, it has major privacy benefits over the PEPP-PT approach; however, this comes at the cost of requiring more computing power on the client side to process infection reports. The Apple/Google Exposure Notification project is based on similar principles as the DP-3T protocol, and supports a variant of it since May 2020. Huawei added a similar implementation of DP-3T to its Huawei Mobile Services APIs known as "Contact Shield" in June 2020. The DP-3T SDK and calibration apps intend to support the Apple/Google API as soon as it is released to iOS and Android devices. On the 21 April 2020, the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health announced that the Swiss national coronavirus contact tracing app will be based on DP-3T. On the 22 April 2020, the Austrian Red Cross, leading on the national digital contact tracing app, announced its migration to the approach of DP-3T. Estonia also confirmed that their app would be based on DP-3T. On April 28, 2020, it was announced that Finland was piloting a version of DP-3T called "Ketju". In Germany, a national app is being built upon DP-3T by SAP SE and Deutsche Telekom alongside CISPA, one of the organisations that authored the protocol. As of September 30, 2020, contact tracing apps using DP-3T are available in Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Switzerland. Decentralized-Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracking (DP-3T, stilizzata come ) è un protocollo open-source sviluppato in risposta alla pandemia di COVID-19 per facilitare la tracciatura dei contatti avuti dai partecipanti infetti. Il protocollo, come anche il protocollo Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT), utilizza Bluetooth Low Energy per tenere traccia e registrare gli incontri con altri utenti. I protocolli differiscono nel loro meccanismo di reportistica: PEPP-PT richiede ai client di caricare i log dei contatti su un server di report centrale e mentre su DP-3T il server di reporting centrale non ha mai accesso ai log di contatti né è responsabile dell'elaborazione e della comunicazione ai client dei contatti avvenuti. Poiché i registri dei contatti non vengono mai trasmessi a terzi, presenta importanti vantaggi in termini di privacy rispetto all'approccio PEPP-PT, tuttavia ciò comporta costi che richiedono maggiore potenza di elaborazione sul lato client per elaborare i rapporti sulle infezioni. Secondo Google, il progetto di tracciamento dei contatti di Google / Apple è stato "fortemente ispirato" dal protocollo DP-3T. L'SDK DP-3T e le app di calibrazione intendono supportare le API Apple / Google non appena verranno rilasciate su dispositivi iOS e Android. Il 21 aprile 2020, l'Ufficio federale della sanità pubblica svedese ha annunciato che l'applicazione nazionale per la tracciatura dei contatti da coronavirus sarà basata su DP-3T. Il 22 aprile 2020, la Croce Rossa austriaca, leader del progetto dell'app nazionale di tracciamento dei contatti digitali, ha annunciato la sua migrazione verso l'approccio di DP-3T. L'Estonia ha inoltre confermato che la sua app sarebbe basata su DP-3T. Il 28 aprile 2020, la Finlandia ha annunciato di stare testando una versione di DP-3T chiamata "Ketju". In Germania, l'app nazionale si basa su DP-3T ed è stata sviluppata da SAP SE e Deutsche Telekom insieme a CISPA, che è una delle organizzazioni che hanno creato il protocollo.
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2020-04-04
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