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Subject Item
dbr:Brute_Force_(Ellis_book)
rdfs:label
Brute Force (Ellis book)
rdfs:comment
Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (published 1990) is a book by the historian John Ellis that concludes that the Allied Forces won World War II not by the skill of their leaders, war planners and commanders in the field, but by brute force, which he describes as advantages in firepower and logistics.
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dbc:History_books_about_World_War_II dbc:1990_non-fiction_books
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1879096
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1105153866
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dbc:History_books_about_World_War_II dbr:Bernard_Law_Montgomery,_1st_Viscount_Montgomery_of_Alamein dbr:Historian dbr:Generals dbc:1990_non-fiction_books dbr:World_War_II dbr:Human_resources dbr:Tanks dbr:Statistic dbr:Sir_Arthur_Harris,_1st_Baronet dbr:Allies_of_World_War_II dbr:North_African_Campaign dbr:World_War_I dbr:Shipping dbr:Douglas_Haig,_1st_Earl_Haig dbr:Soviet_Union dbr:Supreme_Commander_of_the_Allied_Expeditionary_Force dbr:Japan
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dbo:abstract
Brute Force: Allied Strategy and Tactics in the Second World War (published 1990) is a book by the historian John Ellis that concludes that the Allied Forces won World War II not by the skill of their leaders, war planners and commanders in the field, but by brute force, which he describes as advantages in firepower and logistics. Ellis describes what he feels are poor decisions by the Allied High Command with regards to such things as employment of weapons systems or misuses of their overwhelming advantage in manpower. Among his criticisms are the use of tanks in North Africa; the Soviet Union's use of manpower, wasteful bombing strategies, particularly RAF Marshal Sir Arthur Harris's area bombing; and the failure to target Japan's shipping lanes. He also points out the similarities between World War II generals like Bernard Law Montgomery and World War I generals like Douglas Haig, particularly the cautious method that both men used to plan battles. The book is noted for its extensive use of statistical background information.
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wikipedia-en:Brute_Force_(Ellis_book)?oldid=1105153866&ns=0
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wikipedia-en:Brute_Force_(Ellis_book)