• Facets (new session)
• Description
• Metadata
• Settings
  • Rule: ActivityStreamsMapasEquivalentb3sb3sifpdbprdf-labelfacetshttp://dbpedia.org/resource/inference/rules/dbpedia#http://dbpedia.org/resource/inference/rules/opencyc#http://dbpedia.org/resource/inference/rules/umbel#http://dbpedia.org/resource/inference/rules/yago#http://dbpedia.org/schema/property_rules#http://www.ontologyportal.org/inference/rules/SUMO#http://www.ontologyportal.org/inference/rules/WordNet#http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#ldpoplwebskos-transurn:det:rdf:labelvirtrdf-labelvirtrdf-urlNone
    
  • Inverse Functional Properties: Disabled (fastest) Apply to subjects only Apply to objects only Apply to both subjects and objects
  • "Same As": Disabled (fastest) Apply to subjects only Apply to objects only Apply to both subjects and objects (recommended) Apply to subjects, objects and predicates (not recommended on big datasets) Apply to predicates only (special use cases only)

About: Evolutionary argument against naturalism     Goto   Sponge   NotDistinct   Permalink

An Entity of Type : yago:WikicatPhilosophicalArguments, within Data Space : dbpedia.org associated with source document(s)

Type: yago:Abstraction100002137yago:Argument106648724yago:Communication100033020yago:Evidence106643408yago:Indication106797169yago:WikicatPhilosophicalArguments New Facet based on Instances of this Class

The evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN) is a philosophical argument asserting a problem with believing both evolution and philosophical naturalism simultaneously. The argument was first proposed by Alvin Plantinga in 1993 and "raises issues of interest to epistemologists, philosophers of mind, evolutionary biologists, and philosophers of religion". The EAAN argues that the combined belief in both evolutionary theory and naturalism is epistemically self-defeating. The argument for this is that if both evolution and naturalism are true, then the probability of having reliable cognitive faculties is low. This argument comes as an expansion of the argument from reason, although the two are separate philosophical arguments.