In the philosophy of language, a proper name – examples include a name of a specific person or place – is a name which ordinarily is taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning, and it has become a central problem in analytic philosophy. The common-sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic (1843), where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and nonexistent entities, without becoming meaningless, and he show
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| - Nama diri (in)
- Proper name (philosophy) (en)
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| - Dalam filsafat, nama diri adalah sebuah nama yang menunjukkan hakiki suatu hal yang sedang diperbincangkan, tetapi tidak memberitahu lebih lanjut mengenai apa itu. Salah satu tantangan filosofi modern adalah bagaimana cara mendeskripsikan nama yang sebenarnya, dan menjelaskan artinya. (in)
- In the philosophy of language, a proper name – examples include a name of a specific person or place – is a name which ordinarily is taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning, and it has become a central problem in analytic philosophy. The common-sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic (1843), where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and nonexistent entities, without becoming meaningless, and he show (en)
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| - "The only kind of word that is theoretically capable of standing for a particular is a proper name, and the whole matter of proper names is rather curious." (en)
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| - is "and " here used to specify individuals each processing both attributes, or all those possessing either or both attributes? (en)
- stating in which century? (en)
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| - Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge, 1988 (en)
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| - In the philosophy of language, a proper name – examples include a name of a specific person or place – is a name which ordinarily is taken to uniquely identify its referent in the world. As such it presents particular challenges for theories of meaning, and it has become a central problem in analytic philosophy. The common-sense view was originally formulated by John Stuart Mill in A System of Logic (1843), where he defines it as "a word that answers the purpose of showing what thing it is that we are talking about but not of telling anything about it". This view was criticized when philosophers applied principles of formal logic to linguistic propositions. Gottlob Frege pointed out that proper names may apply to imaginary and nonexistent entities, without becoming meaningless, and he showed that sometimes more than one proper name may identify the same entity without having the same sense, so that the phrase "Homer believed the morning star was the evening star" could be meaningful and not tautological in spite of the fact that the morning star and the evening star identifies the same referent. This example became known as Frege's puzzle and is a central issue in the theory of proper names. Bertrand Russell was the first to propose a descriptivist theory of names, which held that a proper name refers not to a referent, but to a set of true propositions that uniquely describe a referent – for example, "Aristotle" refers to "the teacher of Alexander the Great". Rejecting descriptivism, Saul Kripke and Keith Donnellan instead advanced causal-historical theories of reference, which hold that names come to be associated with individual referents because social groups who link the name to its reference in a naming event (e.g. a baptism), which henceforth fixes the value of the name to the specific referent within that community. Today a direct reference theory is common, which holds that proper names refer to their referents without attributing any additional information, connotative or of sense, about them. (en)
- Dalam filsafat, nama diri adalah sebuah nama yang menunjukkan hakiki suatu hal yang sedang diperbincangkan, tetapi tidak memberitahu lebih lanjut mengenai apa itu. Salah satu tantangan filosofi modern adalah bagaimana cara mendeskripsikan nama yang sebenarnya, dan menjelaskan artinya. (in)
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