"La crise des subprimes (en anglais : subprime mortgage crisis) est une crise financi\u00E8re qui a touch\u00E9 le secteur des pr\u00EAts hypoth\u00E9caires \u00E0 risque (en anglais : subprime mortgage) aux \u00C9tats-Unis \u00E0 partir de juillet 2007. Avec la crise bancaire et financi\u00E8re de l'automne 2008, ces deux ph\u00E9nom\u00E8nes inaugurent la crise financi\u00E8re mondiale de 2007-2008. La crise trouve son point de d\u00E9part dans la hausse des taux directeurs de la R\u00E9serve f\u00E9d\u00E9rale \u00E0 partir de 2005. Cette hausse, rench\u00E9rissant le co\u00FBt du remboursement des pr\u00EAts, s'accompagne ainsi d'un taux de d\u00E9faut de 15 % de ces cr\u00E9dits en 2007. En outre, \u00E0 partir de 2007, pour la premi\u00E8re fois depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les prix de l'immobilier baissent. Cette baisse, qui n'avait pas \u00E9t\u00E9 anticip\u00E9e, provoque de nombreuses faillites parmi les organismes de cr\u00E9dit qui avaient d\u00E9livr\u00E9 des subprimes. En effet, ces organismes se remboursent, en cas de d\u00E9faut sur un pr\u00EAt, en vendant le bien immobilier. Cette baisse provoque \u00E9galement des faillites nombreuses parmi les fonds d'investissements qui sp\u00E9culaient sur ces m\u00EAmes pr\u00EAts hypoth\u00E9caires \u00E0 risque. Enfin, la crise s'\u00E9tendit au reste du monde, dans un contexte de contagion, \u00E0 l'ensemble des acteurs \u00E9conomiques en raison de la titrisation, lorsque les banques qui finan\u00E7aient les fonds d'investissement, lesquels avaient fait faillite, refus\u00E8rent de se pr\u00EAter de l'argent de peur qu'elles ne d\u00E9tiennent des liquidit\u00E9s \u00AB toxiques \u00BB. Ces prises de position sont \u00E0 l\u2019origine de la crise financi\u00E8re mondiale de 2007 qui d\u00E9boucha sur la crise bancaire et financi\u00E8re de l'automne 2008, entra\u00EEnant le monde dans la crise \u00E9conomique des ann\u00E9es 2008 et suivantes. La crise des subprimes a instaur\u00E9 une m\u00E9fiance envers les cr\u00E9ances titris\u00E9es comprenant une partie de ces cr\u00E9dits."@fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u6B21\u8CB8\u5371\u6A5F"@zh . . . "\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u4F4F\u5B85\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u5371\u6A5F\uFF08\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u3058\u3085\u3046\u305F\u304F\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u304D\u304D\u3001\u82F1: subprime mortgage crisis\uFF09\u3068\u306F\u30012007\u5E74\u672B\u304B\u30892009\u5E74\u9803\u3092\u4E2D\u5FC3\u3068\u3057\u3066\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u5408\u8846\u56FD\u3067\u8D77\u304D\u305F\u3001\u4F4F\u5B85\u8CFC\u5165\u7528\u9014\u5411\u3051\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u306E\u4E0D\u826F\u50B5\u6A29\u5316\u3067\u3042\u308B\u3002 \u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u3078\u306E\u6295\u8CC7\u3092\u8A3C\u5238\u5316\u3057\u91D1\u878D\u5546\u54C1\u3068\u3057\u3066\u53D6\u5F15\u53EF\u80FD\u306B\u3057\u305F\u300C\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30FB\u30E2\u30FC\u30B2\u30FC\u30B8\u300D\u306F\u3001\u91D1\u878D\u5E02\u5834\u3067\u4FA1\u683C\u304C\u4E0B\u843D\u3059\u308B\u306A\u3069\u3057\u3066\u3001\u30EA\u30FC\u30DE\u30F3\u30FB\u30B7\u30E7\u30C3\u30AF\u3092\u4EE3\u8868\u4F8B\u3068\u3059\u308B\u7D4C\u6E08\u554F\u984C\u306B\u767A\u5C55\u3057\u305F\u3002\u5E74\u8868\u306B\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306F\u3001\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u4F4F\u5B85\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u5371\u6A5F\u306E\u5E74\u8868\u3092\u53C2\u7167\u3002"@ja . . . . . . . . . . "A crise do subprime foi uma crise financeira desencadeada em 24 de julho de 2007, a partir da queda do \u00EDndice Dow Jones motivada pela concess\u00E3o de empr\u00E9stimos hipotec\u00E1rios de alto risco (em ingl\u00EAs: subprime loan ou subprime mortgage), pr\u00E1tica que arrastou v\u00E1rios bancos para uma situa\u00E7\u00E3o de insolv\u00EAncia, repercutindo fortemente sobre as bolsas de valores de todo o mundo. A crise foi motivada pela concess\u00E3o desenfreada de cr\u00E9ditos imobili\u00E1rios, atrav\u00E9s das empresas como a Fannie Mae e Freddie Mac, controladas pelo governo americano, assim como por falhas na regula\u00E7\u00E3o do sistema financeiro que permitiam a transfer\u00EAncia dos cr\u00E9ditos hipotec\u00E1rios (CDS, CDO, etc.) em s\u00E9rie, permitindo a transfer\u00EAncia de riscos para outras contrapartes. Alguns citam tamb\u00E9m que a esse quadro se acrescenta, como plano de fundo da crise a manuten\u00E7\u00E3o de juros reduzidos pelo Fed (o sistema de bancos centrais dos Estados Unidos), como forma de estimular a economia norte americana, rec\u00E9m sa\u00EDda da chamada crise da bolha da internet (fal\u00EAncia das empresas ponto com), que teria ocorrido em 2001. A inten\u00E7\u00E3o do governo norte americano seria de incrementar os investimentos, promovendo uma economia aquecida. A troca de comando em 2006 impediu que um novato assumisse o \u00F4nus da freada obrigat\u00F3ria. Nesse cen\u00E1rio, incentivados pela desregulamenta\u00E7\u00E3o, os bancos norte americanos acirraram a pr\u00E1tica da alavancagem, elevando-a a margens nunca antes vistas, chegando, para exemplificar, ao inacredit\u00E1vel percentual de seguran\u00E7a (dep\u00F3sito compuls\u00F3rio) de 2%, 1%, ou at\u00E9 menos que isso, se consideradas as transa\u00E7\u00F5es ocultas, n\u00E3o computadas nos registros cont\u00E1beis dos bancos. Tornou-se comum no meio financeiro a ado\u00E7\u00E3o de pr\u00E1ticas cada vez mais irrespons\u00E1veis, com a cria\u00E7\u00E3o de in\u00FAmeras \"inova\u00E7\u00F5es financeiras\" de alto risco, muitas das quais aliadas a pr\u00E1ticas de irregularidades, como fraude financeira na avalia\u00E7\u00E3o de risco dos chamados t\u00EDtulos podres, derivativos, CDO baseados nas hipotecas subprime, que foram avaliados com o grau m\u00E1ximo de seguran\u00E7a de investimento (AAA), por ag\u00EAncias de avalia\u00E7\u00E3o de risco acima de qualquer suspeita (at\u00E9 ent\u00E3o), como AIG e a Standard & Poor's. \u00C9 o que explica como tais t\u00EDtulos se espalharam pelo mundo inteiro, intensificando a vastid\u00E3o da crise. A crise do subprime foi imediatamente percebida como muito grave (segundo muitos economistas, a mais grave desde 1929), com possibilidade de se transformar em uma crise sist\u00EAmica, entendida como uma interrup\u00E7\u00E3o da cadeia de pagamentos da economia global, e que tenderia a atingir, de maneira generalizada, todos os setores econ\u00F4micos. \u00C9 considerada como um pren\u00FAncio da crise econ\u00F4mica de 2007-2008."@pt . . . . . . . . "La crisi de les hipoteques subprime es va comen\u00E7ar a estendre pels mercats, principalment, a partir del dijous 9 d'agost de 2007, si b\u00E9 el seu origen es remunta als anys precedents. Les hipoteques subprime s\u00F3n pr\u00E9stecs hipotecaris concedits a clients de baixa solv\u00E8ncia i que, per tant, presenten un risc m\u00E9s elevat de morositat."@ca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0647\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0642\u0627\u0631\u064A \u0647\u064A \u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u062E\u0637\u064A\u0631\u0629 \u0638\u0647\u0631\u062A \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0637\u062D \u0641\u062C\u0623\u0629 \u0639\u0627\u0645 2007 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062A\u064A \u0641\u062C\u0631\u0647\u0627 \u0641\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0628\u062F\u0627\u064A\u0629 \u062A\u0647\u0627\u0641\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0648\u0643 \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0645\u0646\u062D \u0642\u0631\u0648\u0636 \u0639\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062E\u0627\u0637\u0631\u060C \u0648\u0628\u062F\u0623\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u062A\u0643\u0628\u0631 \u0643\u0643\u0631\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062B\u0644\u062C \u0644\u062A\u0647\u062F\u062F \u0642\u0637\u0627\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0642\u0627\u0631\u0627\u062A \u0641\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0648\u0644\u0627\u064A\u0627\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062A\u062D\u062F\u0629 \u062B\u0645 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0648\u0643 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0623\u0633\u0648\u0627\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0644\u0645\u064A\u0629 \u0644\u062A\u0634\u0643\u0644 \u062A\u0647\u062F\u064A\u062F\u0627 \u0644\u0644\u0627\u0642\u062A\u0635\u0627\u062F \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0644\u0645\u064A."@ar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "La crise des subprimes (en anglais : subprime mortgage crisis) est une crise financi\u00E8re qui a touch\u00E9 le secteur des pr\u00EAts hypoth\u00E9caires \u00E0 risque (en anglais : subprime mortgage) aux \u00C9tats-Unis \u00E0 partir de juillet 2007. Avec la crise bancaire et financi\u00E8re de l'automne 2008, ces deux ph\u00E9nom\u00E8nes inaugurent la crise financi\u00E8re mondiale de 2007-2008. La crise des subprimes a instaur\u00E9 une m\u00E9fiance envers les cr\u00E9ances titris\u00E9es comprenant une partie de ces cr\u00E9dits."@fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "2015-12-09"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . "\u0418\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441 \u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410 (2007)"@ru . . . . . . . . . . "\u0418\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441 \u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410 (\u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. subprime mortgage crisis) \u2014 \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u043E-\u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441, \u043F\u0440\u043E\u044F\u0432\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0439\u0441\u044F \u0440\u0435\u0437\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0440\u043E\u0441\u0442\u043E\u043C \u043A\u043E\u043B\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u043D\u0435\u0432\u044B\u043F\u043B\u0430\u0442 \u043F\u043E \u0438\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u043C \u043A\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043C \u0441 \u0432\u044B\u0441\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0443\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043D\u0435\u043C \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043A\u0430 (\u0441\u0443\u0431\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043D\u0430\u044F \u0438\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u043A\u0430, \u0432\u044B\u0434\u0430\u043D\u043D\u0430\u044F \u0437\u0430\u0451\u043C\u0449\u0438\u043A\u0430\u043C \u0441 \u0443\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043D\u0435\u043C \u043A\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0442\u043D\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0441\u043A\u043E\u0440\u0438\u043D\u0433\u0430 \u043D\u0438\u0436\u0435 600), \u0443\u0447\u0430\u0449\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435\u043C \u0441\u043B\u0443\u0447\u0430\u0435\u0432 \u043E\u0442\u0447\u0443\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043D\u0438\u044F \u0431\u0430\u043D\u043A\u0430\u043C\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043B\u043E\u0436\u0435\u043D\u043D\u043E\u0433\u043E \u043D\u0435\u0434\u0432\u0438\u0436\u0438\u043C\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0438\u043C\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430, \u0430 \u0442\u0430\u043A\u0436\u0435 \u0432\u044B\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043D\u043D\u043E\u0435 \u0438\u043C\u0438 \u043F\u0430\u0434\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435 \u0446\u0435\u043D \u043D\u0430 \u0446\u0435\u043D\u043D\u044B\u0435 \u0431\u0443\u043C\u0430\u0433\u0438, \u043E\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043F\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043D\u043D\u044B\u0435 \u0441\u0443\u0431\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043D\u044B\u043C\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043A\u043B\u0430\u0434\u043D\u044B\u043C\u0438. \u042D\u0442\u043E\u0442 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043B \u043D\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0433\u043E \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441\u0430 2007\u20142008 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u043E\u0432, \u043F\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0440\u043E\u0441\u0448\u0435\u0433\u043E \u0432 \u043C\u0438\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0439 \u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441. \u041D\u0443\u0440\u0438\u044D\u043B\u044C \u0420\u0443\u0431\u0438\u043D\u0438"@ru . . "Subprime-krisen var en rikst\u00E4ckande amerikansk bankkris som sammanf\u00F6ll med den amerikanska recessionen fr\u00E5n december 2007 till juni 2009. Den utl\u00F6stes av en stor nedg\u00E5ng i bostadspriserna, vilket resulterade i bol\u00E5nemissk\u00F6tsel och utm\u00E4tningar och devalveringen av bostadsrelaterade v\u00E4rdepapper. Nedg\u00E5ngar i bostadsinvesteringar f\u00F6regick recessionen och f\u00F6ljdes av minskningar i hush\u00E5llens konsumtion och f\u00F6retagsinvesteringar. Utgiftsminskningar var st\u00F6rre i omr\u00E5den med en kombination av h\u00F6g skulds\u00E4ttning bland hush\u00E5llen och st\u00F6rre bostadsprisfall."@sv . . "La crisi dei subprime \u00E8 una crisi finanziaria scoppiata alla fine del 2006 negli Stati Uniti che ha avuto gravi conseguenze sull'economia mondiale, in particolar modo nei paesi sviluppati del mondo occidentale, innescando la grande recessione (da molti considerata la peggior crisi economica dai tempi della grande depressione). Prende il nome dai cosiddetti subprime, prestiti ad alto rischio finanziario erogati dagli istituti di credito in favore di clienti a forte rischio debitorio (insolvenza), considerati da molti analisti come fenomeni di eccessiva speculazione finanziaria."@it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "10062100"^^ . . . . . . . . "2016-01-19"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC(subprime mortgage crisis)\uB294 \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC5D0\uC11C 2007\uB144\uBD80\uD130 2010\uB144\uAE4C\uC9C0\uC758 \uC77C\uB828\uC758 \uACBD\uC81C\uC704\uAE30 \uC0AC\uAC74\uB4E4\uB85C, \uAD6D\uC81C\uAE08\uC735\uC2DC\uC7A5\uC5D0 \uC2E0\uC6A9\uACBD\uC0C9\uC744 \uBD88\uB7EC 2007\u20132008\uB144 \uC138\uACC4 \uAE08\uC735 \uC704\uAE30\uB97C \uC77C\uC73C\uD0A4\uB294 \uB370 \uC9C1\uC811\uC801\uC778 \uC601\uD5A5\uC744 \uC900 \uC804\uC138\uACC4\uC801 \uAE08\uC735 \uC704\uAE30\uC774\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC5D0\uC11C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC70\uD488\uC774 \uAEBC\uC9C4 \uD6C4 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD55C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9\uC758 \uAE09\uB77D\uC73C\uB85C \uCD09\uBC1C\uB410\uC73C\uBA70, \uC774\uB294 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uB860 \uBD80\uC2E4, \uB300\uADDC\uBAA8 \uBC0F \uC8FC\uD0DD\uC800\uB2F9\uC99D\uAD8C \uAC00\uCE58 \uD558\uB77D\uC744 \uC77C\uC73C\uCF30\uB2E4. \uC774\uB85C \uC778\uD55C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uD22C\uC790 \uCE68\uCCB4 \uC774\uD6C4 \uB300\uCE68\uCCB4\uAC00 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD588\uC73C\uBA70, \uADF8 \uD6C4 \uC18C\uBE44\uC790\uC9C0\uCD9C \uBC0F \uC0AC\uC5C5 \uD22C\uC790\uAC00 \uAC10\uC18C\uD558\uB294 \uD604\uC0C1\uC774 \uC77C\uC5B4\uB0AC\uB2E4. \uC18C\uBE44\uC790\uC9C0\uCD9C\uC758 \uACBD\uC6B0 \uB192\uC740 \uAC00\uC815\uBD80\uCC44\uC640 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9 \uAC10\uC18C\uD3ED\uC774 \uB192\uC740 \uC9C0\uC5ED\uC5D0\uC11C \uAC10\uC18C\uC138\uAC00 \uD2B9\uD788 \uB192\uC558\uB2E4. \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC \uBC1C\uBC1C \uC9C1\uC804\uC758 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC70\uD488\uC740 \uC8FC\uD0DD\uC800\uB2F9\uC99D\uAD8C(MBS)\uC640 \uBD80\uCC44 \uB2F4\uBCF4\uBD80 \uC99D\uAD8C(CDO)\uB85C \uC774\uB904\uC838\uC788\uC5C8\uB2E4. \uC774 \uC99D\uAD8C \uC0C1\uD488\uB4E4\uC740 \uCD08\uAE30\uC5D0 \uC774\uC790\uC728\uB85C \uC778\uD55C \uACE0\uC218\uC775\uC728\uACFC \uC758 \uC800\uC704\uD5D8 \uD3C9\uAC00\uB85C \uC778\uAE30\uB97C \uB204\uB838\uB2E4. 2007\uB144\uBD80\uD130 \uACBD\uC81C\uC704\uAE30\uC758 \uC870\uC9D0\uC774 \uBCF4\uC600\uC73C\uB098, 2008\uB144 9\uC6D4 \uB300\uD615 \uB300\uBD80\uC5C5\uCCB4\uB4E4\uC758 \uD30C\uC0B0\uC73C\uB85C \uBCF8\uACA9\uC801\uC73C\uB85C \uAC00\uC2DC\uD654\uB410\uB2E4."@ko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Americk\u00E1 krize trhu s hypot\u00E9kami, kter\u00E1 v \u010Dervenci a srpnu 2007 vy\u00FAstila ve finan\u010Dn\u00ED propad burzovn\u00EDch trh\u016F v USA, byla zp\u016Fsobena rizikov\u00FDmi hypote\u010Dn\u00EDmi \u00FAv\u011Bry. Kv\u016Fli propojenosti trh\u016F se tato krize rychle p\u0159elila do cel\u00E9ho sv\u011Bta a nakonec p\u0159erostla ve sv\u011Btovou finan\u010Dn\u00ED krizi. Kv\u016Fli syst\u00E9mu financov\u00E1n\u00ED hypote\u010Dn\u00EDch \u00FAv\u011Br\u016F ve Spojen\u00FDch st\u00E1tech vznikla finan\u010Dn\u00ED propast, jej\u00EDm\u017E d\u016Fsledkem byl nejv\u011Bt\u0161\u00EDch americk\u00FDch obchodn\u00EDk\u016F s hypot\u00E9kami a p\u016Fj\u010Dkami, jako t\u0159eba New Century Financial Corporation. Cel\u00E1 tato situace m\u011Bla na sv\u011Bdom\u00ED historickou depreciaci americk\u00E9ho dolaru a propad sv\u011Btov\u00FDch burz, co\u017E vyhnalo cenu komodit, zejm\u00E9na ropy, prudce vzh\u016Fru. Vznikla i . \u010Casov\u00E9 vymezen\u00ED t\u00E9to krize je prakticky nemo\u017En\u00E9, nebo\u0165 p\u0159esn\u00FD po\u010D\u00E1tek lze vymezit jen na z\u00E1klad\u011B poznatk\u016F, kdy krize pronikla na ve\u0159ejnost. Jej\u00ED konec nelze pevn\u011B vymezit, proto\u017Ee tato krize se zm\u011Bnila v krizi likvidity. Obecn\u011B lze za po\u010D\u00E1tek hypote\u010Dn\u00ED krize pova\u017Eovat 29. \u010Dervenec 2006, kdy Feder\u00E1ln\u00ED rezervn\u00ED syst\u00E9m navzdory znepokojiv\u00FDm sign\u00E1l\u016Fm zvedl z\u00E1kladn\u00ED \u00FArokovou sazbu. Za zm\u011Bnu t\u00E9to krize na krizi likvidity lze pova\u017Eovat 14. srpen, kdy do\u0161lo k bankovn\u00EDmu runu na , co\u017E byla banka, jej\u00ED\u017E probl\u00E9my nem\u011Bly souvislost s hypote\u010Dn\u00EDmi \u00FAv\u011Bry."@cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Subprime-krisen"@sv . . "300"^^ . . . "Crisi dei subprime"@it . "Krisis hipotek subprima Amerika Serikat adalah salah satu indikator pertama krisis finansial 2007\u20132010. Dalam krisis ini, pelanggaran dan penyitaan hipotek meningkat, sehingga jaminan hipotek mengalami penurunan. Rasio berkualitas rendah yang awalnya 8% atau lebih rendah meningkat menjadi sekitar 20% dari tahun 2004\u20132006. Bahkan di beberapa daerah di Amerika Serikat, rasionya jauh lebih tinggi. Sebagian besar dari hipotek tersebut (lebih dari 90% pada tahun 2006) merupakan (ARM, pinjaman hipotek dengan tingkat bunga yang dapat ditingkatkan secara periodik berdasarkan indeks). Dua perubahan tersebut merupakan bagian dari tren penurunan standar peminjaman dan hipotek berisiko tinggi. Lebih lagi, utang rumah-rumah tangga di Amerika Serikat semakin menumpuk, dengan rasio utang dengan pendapatan pribadi yang dapat dibelanjakan meningkat dari 77% pada tahun 1990 menjadi 127% pada akhir 2007; sebagian besar peningkatan tersebut diakibatkan oleh hipotek. Setelah harga penjualan rumah di AS memuncak pada pertengahan tahun 2006 dan mulai menurun, pengembalian uang menjadi lebih sulit. Dengan melonjaknya tingkat bunga ARM, pelanggaran hipotek meningkat. Jaminan hipotek, termasuk hipotek subprima, yang sebagian besar dipegang oleh firma-firma keuangan, kehilangan nilainya. Investor global juga mengurangi pembelian utang hipotek dan jaminan lainnya, sehingga kapasitas dan kemauan sistem keuangan swasta untuk membantu peminjaman menurun. Keprihatinan akan pasar kredit dan finansial AS mengakibatkan pengetatan kredit di seluruh dunia dan pelambatan pertumbuhan ekonomi di AS dan Eropa."@in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Krisis hipotek subprima Amerika Serikat adalah salah satu indikator pertama krisis finansial 2007\u20132010. Dalam krisis ini, pelanggaran dan penyitaan hipotek meningkat, sehingga jaminan hipotek mengalami penurunan. Rasio berkualitas rendah yang awalnya 8% atau lebih rendah meningkat menjadi sekitar 20% dari tahun 2004\u20132006. Bahkan di beberapa daerah di Amerika Serikat, rasionya jauh lebih tinggi. Sebagian besar dari hipotek tersebut (lebih dari 90% pada tahun 2006) merupakan (ARM, pinjaman hipotek dengan tingkat bunga yang dapat ditingkatkan secara periodik berdasarkan indeks). Dua perubahan tersebut merupakan bagian dari tren penurunan standar peminjaman dan hipotek berisiko tinggi. Lebih lagi, utang rumah-rumah tangga di Amerika Serikat semakin menumpuk, dengan rasio utang dengan pendap"@in . . . . . . "Americk\u00E1 hypote\u010Dn\u00ED krize 2007"@cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Crise do subprime"@pt . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Krisis hipotek subprima"@in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC"@ko . . . . . . . . . "La crisi de les hipoteques subprime es va comen\u00E7ar a estendre pels mercats, principalment, a partir del dijous 9 d'agost de 2007, si b\u00E9 el seu origen es remunta als anys precedents. Les hipoteques subprime s\u00F3n pr\u00E9stecs hipotecaris concedits a clients de baixa solv\u00E8ncia i que, per tant, presenten un risc m\u00E9s elevat de morositat."@ca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "1120198635"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u4F4F\u5B85\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u5371\u6A5F"@ja . . . . . . . "\"Members of the Right tried to blame the seeming market failures on government; in their mind the government effort to push people with low incomes into home ownership was the source of the problem. Widespread as this belief has become in conservative circles, virtually all serious attempts to evaluate the evidence have concluded that there is little merit in this view.\""@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u0418\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441 \u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410 (\u0430\u043D\u0433\u043B. subprime mortgage crisis) \u2014 \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u043E-\u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441, \u043F\u0440\u043E\u044F\u0432\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0439\u0441\u044F \u0440\u0435\u0437\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0440\u043E\u0441\u0442\u043E\u043C \u043A\u043E\u043B\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0430 \u043D\u0435\u0432\u044B\u043F\u043B\u0430\u0442 \u043F\u043E \u0438\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u043C \u043A\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043C \u0441 \u0432\u044B\u0441\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0443\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043D\u0435\u043C \u0440\u0438\u0441\u043A\u0430 (\u0441\u0443\u0431\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043D\u0430\u044F \u0438\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u043A\u0430, 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\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043F\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043D\u043D\u044B\u0435 \u0441\u0443\u0431\u0441\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0434\u0430\u0440\u0442\u043D\u044B\u043C\u0438 \u0437\u0430\u043A\u043B\u0430\u0434\u043D\u044B\u043C\u0438. \u042D\u0442\u043E\u0442 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441 \u0441\u0442\u0430\u043B \u043D\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0433\u043E \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441\u0430 2007\u20142008 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u043E\u0432, \u043F\u0435\u0440\u0435\u0440\u043E\u0441\u0448\u0435\u0433\u043E \u0432 \u043C\u0438\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0439 \u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u0447\u0435\u0441\u043A\u0438\u0439 \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441. \u0422\u0440\u0430\u0434\u0438\u0446\u0438\u043E\u043D\u043D\u043E \u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u0434\u043E\u043B\u044F \u0438\u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0447\u043D\u044B\u0445 \u043A\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438\u0442\u043E\u0432 \u0441 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"Subprime hipoteken krisia"@eu . . . "\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0647\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0642\u0627\u0631\u064A"@ar . . . . . . . . . . "Subprime mortgage crisis"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u6B21\u8CB8\u5371\u6A5F\uFF0C\u5168\u540D\u6B21\u7D1A\u623F\u5C4B\u501F\u8CB8\u5371\u6A5F\uFF08\u82F1\u8A9E\uFF1ASubprime mortgage crisis\uFF09\uFF0C\u662F\u7531\u7F8E\u570B\u570B\u5167\u62B5\u62BC\u8CB8\u6B3E\u9055\u7D04\u548C\u6CD5\u62CD\u5C4B\u6025\u5287\u589E\u52A0\u6240\u5F15\u767C\u7684\u91D1\u878D\u5371\u6A5F\uFF0C\u4EA6\u91CD\u5927\u5F71\u97FF\u5230\u5168\u7403\u5404\u5730\u9280\u884C\u8207\u91D1\u878D\u5E02\u5834\u3002\u6B21\u8CB8\u5371\u6A5F\u4EE52007\u5E744\u6708\u7F8E\u56FD\u7B2C\u4E8C\u5927\u6B21\u7EA7\u623F\u8D37\u516C\u53F8\u65B0\u4E16\u7EAA\u91D1\u878D\u516C\u53F8\u7834\u4EA7\u4E8B\u4EF6\u4E3A\u300C\u6807\u5FD7\u300D\uFF0C\u7531\u623F\u5730\u4EA7\u5E02\u573A\u8513\u5EF6\u5230\u4FE1\u8D37\u5E02\u573A\uFF0C\u8BB8\u591A\u91D1\u878D\u673A\u6784\u548C\u4ED6\u4EEC\u7684\u5BA2\u6237\u635F\u5931\u60E8\u91CD\uFF0C\u8FDB\u800C\u6F14\u53D8\u4E3A\u5168\u7403\u6027\u91D1\u878D\u5371\u673A\uFF0C\u6210\u4E3A\u4E8621\u4E16\u7EAA\u521D\u4E16\u754C\u7ECF\u6D4E\u5927\u8870\u9000\u7684\u4E00\u4E2A\u91CD\u8981\u90E8\u5206\uFF0C\u5F15\u767C2008\u5E74\u91D1\u878D\u6D77\u562F\uFF08\u6216\u7A312008\u5E74\u4E16\u754C\u7ECF\u6D4E\u5371\u673A\uFF09\u3002 21\u4E16\u7EAA\u521D\u7F8E\u56FD\u623F\u5730\u4EA7\u5E02\u573A\u6301\u7EED\u8D70\u9AD8\uFF0C\u4FE1\u7528\u4E0D\u597D\u7684\u501F\u6B3E\u4EBA\u4E5F\u80FD\u5229\u7528\u6B21\u7D1A\u8CB8\u6B3E\uFF08\u7C21\u7A31\u6B21\u8CB8\uFF09\u83B7\u5F97\u8D37\u6B3E\u3002\u91D1\u878D\u673A\u6784\u628A\u94B1\u501F\u7ED9\u90A3\u4E9B\u80FD\u529B\u4E0D\u8DB3\u4EE5\u511F\u6E05\u8CB8\u6B3E\u7684\u4EBA\uFF0C\u7136\u540E\u628A\u8FD9\u4E9B\u8CB8\u6B3E\u7D44\u5408\u70BA\u4F4F\u623F\u62B5\u62BC\u8CB8\u6B3E\u8B49\u5238\u4EE5\u81F3\u91D1\u878D\u884D\u751F\u54C1\uFF0C\u518D\u6253\u5305\u5206\u5272\u51FA\u552E\u7ED9\u6295\u8D44\u8005\u548C\u5176\u4ED6\u7684\u91D1\u878D\u673A\u6784\u3002\u8BC4\u7EA7\u673A\u6784\u4E0D\u8D1F\u8D23\u4EFB\u5730\u5C06\u8FD9\u4E9B\u503A\u5238\u8BC4\u4E3AAAA\u7EA7\uFF0C\u800C\u4E70\u5BB6\u4E5F\u4EE5\u4E3A\u81EA\u5DF1\u53EF\u4EE5\u900F\u8FC7\u4FE1\u7528\u8FDD\u7EA6\u6389\u671F\u7B49\u624B\u6BB5\u89C4\u907F\u98CE\u9669\u3002\u9019\u4E9B\u300C\u7522\u54C1\u300D\u5C42\u5C42\u5305\u88C5\u8F6C\u5356\u7684\u60C5\u51B5\u4E0B\uFF0C\u94FE\u6761\u4E0A\u7684\u673A\u6784\u90FD\u4F4E\u4F30\u4E86\u98CE\u9669\u3002\u5F53\u7F8E\u56FD\u623F\u4EF7\u5F00\u59CB\u4E0B\u8DCC\u65F6\uFF0C\u6B21\u7EA7\u8D37\u6B3E\u5927\u91CF\u8FDD\u7EA6\uFF0C\u90A3\u4E9B\u4F4F\u623F\u62B5\u62BC\u8CB8\u6B3E\u8B49\u5238\u5931\u53BB\u5927\u90E8\u5206\u7684\u50F9\u503C\u3002\u9020\u6210\u8A31\u591A\u91D1\u878D\u673A\u6784\u8CC7\u672C\u5927\u5E45\u4E0B\u964D\uFF0C\u96F7\u66FC\u5144\u5F1F\u7834\u4EA7\uFF0C\u7F8E\u56FD\u56FD\u9645\u96C6\u56E2\u6FD2\u4E34\u5012\u95ED\uFF0C\u9020\u6210\u4E16\u754C\u5404\u5730\u7DCA\u7E2E\u4FE1\u8CB8\u3002 \u91D1\u878D\u5371\u673A\u7684\u539F\u56E0\u4F17\u8BF4\u7EB7\u7EAD\uFF0C\u4E00\u822C\u8BA4\u4E3A\u6709\uFF1A\u7CFB\u7EDF\u98CE\u9669\u4F4E\u4F30\u3001\u9053\u5FB7\u98CE\u9669\u3001\u8BC4\u7EA7\u673A\u6784\u5931\u804C\u4EE5\u53CA\u91D1\u878D\u76D1\u7BA1\u7F3A\u4F4D\u7B49\u3002"@zh . . . . . . . "\uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC(subprime mortgage crisis)\uB294 \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC5D0\uC11C 2007\uB144\uBD80\uD130 2010\uB144\uAE4C\uC9C0\uC758 \uC77C\uB828\uC758 \uACBD\uC81C\uC704\uAE30 \uC0AC\uAC74\uB4E4\uB85C, \uAD6D\uC81C\uAE08\uC735\uC2DC\uC7A5\uC5D0 \uC2E0\uC6A9\uACBD\uC0C9\uC744 \uBD88\uB7EC 2007\u20132008\uB144 \uC138\uACC4 \uAE08\uC735 \uC704\uAE30\uB97C \uC77C\uC73C\uD0A4\uB294 \uB370 \uC9C1\uC811\uC801\uC778 \uC601\uD5A5\uC744 \uC900 \uC804\uC138\uACC4\uC801 \uAE08\uC735 \uC704\uAE30\uC774\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC5D0\uC11C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC70\uD488\uC774 \uAEBC\uC9C4 \uD6C4 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD55C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9\uC758 \uAE09\uB77D\uC73C\uB85C \uCD09\uBC1C\uB410\uC73C\uBA70, \uC774\uB294 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uB860 \uBD80\uC2E4, \uB300\uADDC\uBAA8 \uBC0F \uC8FC\uD0DD\uC800\uB2F9\uC99D\uAD8C \uAC00\uCE58 \uD558\uB77D\uC744 \uC77C\uC73C\uCF30\uB2E4. \uC774\uB85C \uC778\uD55C \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uD22C\uC790 \uCE68\uCCB4 \uC774\uD6C4 \uB300\uCE68\uCCB4\uAC00 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD588\uC73C\uBA70, \uADF8 \uD6C4 \uC18C\uBE44\uC790\uC9C0\uCD9C \uBC0F \uC0AC\uC5C5 \uD22C\uC790\uAC00 \uAC10\uC18C\uD558\uB294 \uD604\uC0C1\uC774 \uC77C\uC5B4\uB0AC\uB2E4. \uC18C\uBE44\uC790\uC9C0\uCD9C\uC758 \uACBD\uC6B0 \uB192\uC740 \uAC00\uC815\uBD80\uCC44\uC640 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9 \uAC10\uC18C\uD3ED\uC774 \uB192\uC740 \uC9C0\uC5ED\uC5D0\uC11C \uAC10\uC18C\uC138\uAC00 \uD2B9\uD788 \uB192\uC558\uB2E4. \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC \uBC1C\uBC1C \uC9C1\uC804\uC758 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC70\uD488\uC740 \uC8FC\uD0DD\uC800\uB2F9\uC99D\uAD8C(MBS)\uC640 \uBD80\uCC44 \uB2F4\uBCF4\uBD80 \uC99D\uAD8C(CDO)\uB85C \uC774\uB904\uC838\uC788\uC5C8\uB2E4. \uC774 \uC99D\uAD8C \uC0C1\uD488\uB4E4\uC740 \uCD08\uAE30\uC5D0 \uC774\uC790\uC728\uB85C \uC778\uD55C \uACE0\uC218\uC775\uC728\uACFC \uC758 \uC800\uC704\uD5D8 \uD3C9\uAC00\uB85C \uC778\uAE30\uB97C \uB204\uB838\uB2E4. 2007\uB144\uBD80\uD130 \uACBD\uC81C\uC704\uAE30\uC758 \uC870\uC9D0\uC774 \uBCF4\uC600\uC73C\uB098, 2008\uB144 9\uC6D4 \uB300\uD615 \uB300\uBD80\uC5C5\uCCB4\uB4E4\uC758 \uD30C\uC0B0\uC73C\uB85C \uBCF8\uACA9\uC801\uC73C\uB85C \uAC00\uC2DC\uD654\uB410\uB2E4. \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC \uC6D0\uC778\uC73C\uB85C\uB294 \uAE08\uC735 \uAE30\uAD00, \uADDC\uC81C, \uC2E0\uC6A9\uD3C9\uAC00\uAE30\uAD00, \uC815\uBD80 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uC815\uCC45, \uC18C\uBE44\uC790\uB97C \uD3EC\uD568\uD55C \uB2E4\uC591\uD55C \uC694\uC778\uB4E4\uC774 \uAC70\uB860\uB410\uB2E4. \uC774 \uC911 \uADFC\uC778\uC740 \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uC758 \uC99D\uAC00\uC640 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uD22C\uAE30 \uAE09\uC99D \uB450 \uAC00\uC9C0\uC600\uB2E4. \uACE0\uC704\uD5D8\uC131 \uAE08\uC735\uC0C1\uD488\uC778 \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uC758 \uBE44\uC728\uC740 2004\uB144 8% \uC774\uD558\uC5D0\uC11C 2006\uB144 \uCD94\uC815\uCE58 20%\uB85C \uAE09\uC99D\uD588\uC73C\uBA70, \uC77C\uBD80 \uBBF8\uAD6D \uC9C0\uC5ED\uC5D0\uC120 \uC774\uBCF4\uB2E4 \uD604\uC800\uD788 \uB192\uC740 \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uBE44\uC728\uC744 \uAE30\uB85D\uD588\uB2E4. \uC774 \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uC758 \uB300\uBD80\uBD84(2006\uB144 \uAE30\uC900\uC73C\uB85C 90% \uC774\uC0C1)\uC740 \uC77C\uC815 \uAE30\uAC04 \uD6C4 \uC774\uC790\uC728\uC774 \uC0C1\uC2B9\uD558\uB294 \uC870\uAC74\uC774 \uBD99\uC5C8\uB2E4. \uB3D9\uC2DC\uAE30, \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uD22C\uAE30 \uB610\uD55C \uC99D\uAC00\uD574, \uC18C\uC720 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0\uC5D0 \uAC70\uC8FC\uD558\uC9C0 \uC54A\uB294 \uD22C\uC790\uC790\uC758 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uBE44\uC728\uC774 2000\uB144 20%\uC5D0\uC11C 2006\u20132007\uB144 \uACBD 35%\uB85C \uC0C1\uC2B9\uD588\uB2E4. \uC774 \uD22C\uC790\uC790\uB4E4\uC740 \uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uD3C9\uAC00\uB97C \uBC1B\uC740 \uC774\uB4E4\uC744 \uD3EC\uD568\uD574\uB3C4 \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9 \uD558\uB77D\uC2DC \uCC44\uBB34 \uBD88\uC774\uD589(\uB514\uD3F4\uD2B8)\uC744 \uC120\uC5B8\uD558\uB294 \uBE44\uC911\uC774 \uBE44\uD22C\uC790\uC790\uB4E4\uBCF4\uB2E4 \uD6E8\uC52C \uB192\uC558\uB2E4. \uC774\uB294 \uACE0\uC704\uD5D8\uC131 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0C1\uD488\uC758 \uB300\uCD9C\uC870\uAC74 \uC644\uD654\uB85C \uB9D0\uBBF8\uC554\uC544 \uC0DD\uAE34 \uBCC0\uD654\uB85C, \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC758 \uAC00\uC815\uBD80\uCC44\uB97C \uC99D\uAC00\uD558\uB294 \uD604\uC0C1\uC73C\uB85C \uC774\uC5B4\uC84C\uB2E4. \uAC00\uCC98\uBD84 \uC18C\uB4DD\uC5D0 \uB300\uD55C \uAC00\uC815\uBD80\uCC44 \uBE44\uC728\uC740 1990\uB144 77%\uC5D0\uC11C 2007\uB144 \uB9D0 127%\uAE4C\uC9C0 \uCE58\uC19F\uC558\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D \uAC70\uC8FC\uC9C0 \uAC00\uACA9\uC774 2006\uB144 \uC911\uBC18 \uC815\uC810\uC744 \uAE30\uB85D\uD558\uACE0 \uAE09\uB77D\uD558\uC790, \uCC28\uC785\uC790\uAC00 \uB300\uCD9C\uC744 \uC0C1\uD658\uD558\uB294 \uB370\uC5D0 \uCC28\uC9C8\uC774 \uC0DD\uACBC\uB2E4. \uBCC0\uB3D9 \uAE08\uB9AC \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uAC00 \uACC4\uC57D\uAE30\uAC04 \uD6C4 \uC774\uC790\uC728\uC744 \uB192\uC5EC \uC6D4\uC138\uAC00 \uC99D\uAC00\uD558\uC790, \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC5F0\uCCB4 \uC218\uAC00 \uAE09\uC99D\uD588\uB2E4. \uB54C\uBB38\uC5D0 \uC11C\uD504\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0\uB97C \uD3EC\uD568\uD55C \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uB860\uC73C\uB85C \uAD6C\uC131\uB41C \uC99D\uAD8C\uC740 \uAC00\uCE58\uB97C \uC0C1\uC2E4\uD558\uBA74\uC11C \uC774\uC5D0 \uD22C\uC790\uD55C \uAD6D\uC81C\uAE08\uC735\uAE30\uC5C5\uB4E4\uC758 \uC190\uC2E4\uC774 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD588\uB2E4. \uAD6D\uC81C \uD22C\uC790\uC790\uB4E4\uC740 \uC0AC\uAE08\uC735 \uB300\uCD9C\uC774 \uAC10\uC18C\uD558\uBA74\uC11C \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uAE30\uBC18 \uB300\uCD9C \uBC0F \uC99D\uAD8C\uB4E4\uC758 \uAD6C\uC785\uC744 \uC0AC\uC591\uD558\uAC8C \uB410\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC758 \uC2E0\uC6A9 \uBC0F \uACBD\uC81C \uAC74\uC804\uC131\uC5D0 \uB300\uD55C \uC6B0\uB824\uAC00 \uB192\uC544\uC9C0\uC790, \uC774\uC5D0 \uB530\uB77C \uC804\uC138\uACC4\uC801 \uC2E0\uC6A9\uC704\uCD95\uACFC \uBBF8\uAD6D\uACFC \uC720\uB7FD\uC758 \uACBD\uC81C\uC131\uC7A5\uB960 \uAC10\uC18C\uAC00 \uBC1C\uC0DD\uD588\uB2E4. \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uACBD\uC81C\uC704\uAE30\uB294 \uBBF8\uAD6D\uACFC \uC720\uB7FD \uAD6D\uAC00\uB4E4\uC5D0\uAC8C \uC7A5\uAE30\uAC04\uC758 \uC545\uC601\uD5A5\uC744 \uB07C\uCCE4\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC740 \uC2EC\uAC01\uD55C \uC218\uC900\uC758 \uACBD\uC81C \uACF5\uD669\uC5D0 \uC811\uC5B4\uB4E4\uC5B4 2008\uB144\uACFC 2009\uB144 \uB3D9\uC548 \uC804\uCCB4 \uB178\uB3D9\uC778\uAD6C\uC758 6%\uC5D0 \uD574\uB2F9\uD558\uB294 900\uB9CC \uBA85\uC758 \uB178\uB3D9\uC790\uB4E4\uC774 \uC2E4\uC5C5\uC790\uAC00 \uB410\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D \uC2E4\uC5C5\uC728\uC740 2014\uB144 5\uC6D4\uC5D0 \uB4E4\uC5B4\uC11C\uC57C \uACF5\uD669 \uC774\uC804\uC778 2007\uB144 12\uC6D4 \uACBD \uC218\uCE58\uB85C \uD68C\uBCF5\uB410\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC758 \uAC00\uAD6C\uC21C\uC790\uC0B0\uC740 \uACF5\uD669\uC804 2007\uB144 2\uBD84\uAE30\uC5D0\uC11C 13\uC870 \uB2EC\uB7EC (20%) \uAC00\uB7C9 \uCD94\uB77D\uD574 2012\uB144 4\uBD84\uAE30\uC5D0\uC11C\uC57C \uC6D0\uB798 \uC218\uCE58\uB85C \uD68C\uBCF5\uD560 \uC218 \uC788\uC5C8\uB2E4. \uBBF8\uAD6D \uBD80\uB3D9\uC0B0 \uAC00\uACA9\uACFC \uC8FC\uC2DD\uC2DC\uC7A5\uC740 2009\uB144 \uCD08\uAE4C\uC9C0 \uAC01\uAC01 \uD3C9\uADE0 30%, 50% \uAC10\uC18C\uD588\uC73C\uBA70, \uC8FC\uC2DD\uC740 2012\uB144 9\uC6D4\uC5D0 \uB4E4\uC5B4\uC11C\uC57C 2007\uB144 12\uC6D4\uC758 \uC218\uCE58\uB85C \uD68C\uBCF5\uD588\uB2E4. \uC720\uB7FD \uB610\uD55C \uC11C\uBE0C\uD504\uB77C\uC784 \uBAA8\uAE30\uC9C0 \uC0AC\uD0DC\uB85C \uC778\uD574 \uC720\uB7FD \uAD6D\uAC00 \uBD80\uCC44 \uC704\uAE30\uB97C \uACAA\uC5C8\uC73C\uBA70, 2008\uB144\uBD80\uD130 2012\uB144\uAE4C\uC9C0 \uC2E4\uC5C5 \uD574\uACB0 \uBC0F \uAE08\uC735 \uAC74\uC804\uC131 \uD68C\uBCF5\uC5D0 \uCD94\uC815\uCE58 9400\uC5B5 \uC720\uB85C\uB97C \uD22C\uC785\uD574\uC57C \uD588\uB2E4."@ko . . . . . . . "\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0631\u0647\u0646 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0642\u0627\u0631\u064A \u0647\u064A \u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u062E\u0637\u064A\u0631\u0629 \u0638\u0647\u0631\u062A \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0637\u062D \u0641\u062C\u0623\u0629 \u0639\u0627\u0645 2007 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u062A\u064A \u0641\u062C\u0631\u0647\u0627 \u0641\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0628\u062F\u0627\u064A\u0629 \u062A\u0647\u0627\u0641\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0648\u0643 \u0639\u0644\u0649 \u0645\u0646\u062D \u0642\u0631\u0648\u0636 \u0639\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062E\u0627\u0637\u0631\u060C \u0648\u0628\u062F\u0623\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0623\u0632\u0645\u0629 \u062A\u0643\u0628\u0631 \u0643\u0643\u0631\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u062B\u0644\u062C \u0644\u062A\u0647\u062F\u062F \u0642\u0637\u0627\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0642\u0627\u0631\u0627\u062A \u0641\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0648\u0644\u0627\u064A\u0627\u062A \u0627\u0644\u0645\u062A\u062D\u062F\u0629 \u062B\u0645 \u0627\u0644\u0628\u0646\u0648\u0643 \u0648\u0627\u0644\u0623\u0633\u0648\u0627\u0642 \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A\u0629 \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0644\u0645\u064A\u0629 \u0644\u062A\u0634\u0643\u0644 \u062A\u0647\u062F\u064A\u062F\u0627 \u0644\u0644\u0627\u0642\u062A\u0635\u0627\u062F \u0627\u0644\u0645\u0627\u0644\u064A \u0627\u0644\u0639\u0627\u0644\u0645\u064A."@ar . . . . "\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u4F4F\u5B85\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u5371\u6A5F\uFF08\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u3058\u3085\u3046\u305F\u304F\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u304D\u304D\u3001\u82F1: subprime mortgage crisis\uFF09\u3068\u306F\u30012007\u5E74\u672B\u304B\u30892009\u5E74\u9803\u3092\u4E2D\u5FC3\u3068\u3057\u3066\u30A2\u30E1\u30EA\u30AB\u5408\u8846\u56FD\u3067\u8D77\u304D\u305F\u3001\u4F4F\u5B85\u8CFC\u5165\u7528\u9014\u5411\u3051\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u306E\u4E0D\u826F\u50B5\u6A29\u5316\u3067\u3042\u308B\u3002 \u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u3078\u306E\u6295\u8CC7\u3092\u8A3C\u5238\u5316\u3057\u91D1\u878D\u5546\u54C1\u3068\u3057\u3066\u53D6\u5F15\u53EF\u80FD\u306B\u3057\u305F\u300C\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u30FB\u30E2\u30FC\u30B2\u30FC\u30B8\u300D\u306F\u3001\u91D1\u878D\u5E02\u5834\u3067\u4FA1\u683C\u304C\u4E0B\u843D\u3059\u308B\u306A\u3069\u3057\u3066\u3001\u30EA\u30FC\u30DE\u30F3\u30FB\u30B7\u30E7\u30C3\u30AF\u3092\u4EE3\u8868\u4F8B\u3068\u3059\u308B\u7D4C\u6E08\u554F\u984C\u306B\u767A\u5C55\u3057\u305F\u3002\u5E74\u8868\u306B\u3064\u3044\u3066\u306F\u3001\u30B5\u30D6\u30D7\u30E9\u30A4\u30E0\u4F4F\u5B85\u30ED\u30FC\u30F3\u5371\u6A5F\u306E\u5E74\u8868\u3092\u53C2\u7167\u3002"@ja . . . . . . . . . "317721"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "La crisis de las hipotecas subprime fue una crisis financiera por desconfianza crediticia que se extendi\u00F3 inicialmente por los mercados financieros de Estados Unidos y fue la alarma que puso en el punto de mira a las hipotecas \"basura\" de Europa desde el verano del 2007, evidenci\u00E1ndose al verano siguiente con la crisis financiera de 2008. Generalmente, se considera el detonante de la Gran Recesi\u00F3n en el plano internacional, incluyendo la burbuja inmobiliaria en Espa\u00F1a."@es . . . . . "Crisis de las hipotecas subprime"@es . . . "Subprime-krisen var en rikst\u00E4ckande amerikansk bankkris som sammanf\u00F6ll med den amerikanska recessionen fr\u00E5n december 2007 till juni 2009. Den utl\u00F6stes av en stor nedg\u00E5ng i bostadspriserna, vilket resulterade i bol\u00E5nemissk\u00F6tsel och utm\u00E4tningar och devalveringen av bostadsrelaterade v\u00E4rdepapper. Nedg\u00E5ngar i bostadsinvesteringar f\u00F6regick recessionen och f\u00F6ljdes av minskningar i hush\u00E5llens konsumtion och f\u00F6retagsinvesteringar. Utgiftsminskningar var st\u00F6rre i omr\u00E5den med en kombination av h\u00F6g skulds\u00E4ttning bland hush\u00E5llen och st\u00F6rre bostadsprisfall. Utvidgningen av hush\u00E5llsskulder finansierades med mortgage-backed securities (MBS) och (CDO), som till en b\u00F6rjan erbj\u00F6d attraktiv avkastning p\u00E5 grund av h\u00F6gre r\u00E4ntor p\u00E5 bol\u00E5n; den l\u00E5ga kreditv\u00E4rdigheten orsakade dock slutligen en massiv brist i betalning. D\u00E5 delar av krisen f\u00F6rst blev mer synliga under 2007, kollapsade flera stora finansinstitut i september 2008, med betydande st\u00F6rningar i kreditfl\u00F6det till f\u00F6retag och konsumenter och uppkomsten av en allvarlig global recession. Det fanns m\u00E5nga orsaker till krisen, d\u00E4r bed\u00F6mare tilldelar olika niv\u00E5er av skuld till finansinstitut, tillsynsmyndigheter, kreditv\u00E4rderingsinstitut, statlig bostadspolitik och konsumenter, bland annat. En omedelbar orsak var de stigande subprimel\u00E5nen. Procentandelen av subprimel\u00E5n med l\u00E4gre kvalitet som uppkom under ett visst \u00E5r steg fr\u00E5n historiska 8% eller l\u00E4gre intervallet till cirka 20% fr\u00E5n 2004 till 2006, med betydligt h\u00F6gre f\u00F6rh\u00E5llanden i vissa delar av USA. En stor andel av dessa subprimel\u00E5n, \u00F6ver 90% \u00E5r 2006 till exempel, var justerbara r\u00E4ntebol\u00E5n. Dessa tv\u00E5 f\u00F6r\u00E4ndringar var en del av en bredare trend av s\u00E4nkta utl\u00E5ningskrav och bol\u00E5neprodukter med h\u00F6g risk. De amerikanska hush\u00E5llen hade blivit mer och mer skuldsatta, f\u00F6rh\u00E5llandet mellan skulder och personlig disponibel inkomst \u00F6kade fr\u00E5n 77% \u00E5r 1990 till 127% i slutet av 2007, en stor del av denna \u00F6kning var bol\u00E5nerelaterad. N\u00E4r de amerikanska bostadspriserna sj\u00F6nk kraftigt efter en topp i mitten av 2006, blev det sv\u00E5rare f\u00F6r l\u00E5ntagare att omfinansiera sina l\u00E5n. D\u00E5 justerbara bol\u00E5n b\u00F6rjade att \u00E5terst\u00E4llas till en h\u00F6gre r\u00E4nta (som orsakade h\u00F6gre m\u00E5natliga betalningar), sk\u00F6ts bol\u00E5nemissk\u00F6tseln i h\u00F6jden. V\u00E4rdepapper uppbackade med bol\u00E5n, inklusive subprimel\u00E5n, som ofta innehades av globala finansbolag, f\u00F6rlorade det mesta av sitt v\u00E4rde. Globala investerare minskade ocks\u00E5 drastiskt ink\u00F6p av bol\u00E5nebaserade skulder och andra v\u00E4rdepapper som en del av en nedg\u00E5ng i kapaciteten och viljan av det privata finansiella systemet att st\u00F6dja utl\u00E5ningen. Oron kring den sunda amerikanska kreditmarknaden och de finansiella marknaderna har ledde till stramare kredit runt om i v\u00E4rlden och avtagande ekonomisk tillv\u00E4xt i USA och Europa. Krisen hade allvarliga, l\u00E5ngvariga konsekvenser f\u00F6r de amerikanska och europeiska ekonomierna. USA gick in i en djup recession, d\u00E4r n\u00E4stan 9 miljoner arbeten f\u00F6rsvann under 2008 och 2009, cirka 6% av arbetskraften. En uppskattning av f\u00F6rlorad produktion fr\u00E5n krisen uppkommer till \"minst 40% av 2007 \u00E5rs bruttonationalprodukt\". Amerikanska bostadspriser sj\u00F6nk i genomsnitt n\u00E4stan 30% och den amerikanska aktiemarknaden f\u00F6ll cirka 50% i b\u00F6rjan av 2009. I b\u00F6rjan av 2013 hade den amerikanska aktiemarknaden \u00E5terh\u00E4mtat sig till sin topp f\u00F6re krisen men bostadspriserna fortsatte att ligga n\u00E4ra bottenniv\u00E5n och arbetsl\u00F6sheten fortsatte vara h\u00F6g. Den ekonomiska tillv\u00E4xten f\u00F6rblev under de niv\u00E5erna som var f\u00F6re krisen. Europa fortsatte ocks\u00E5 att k\u00E4mpa med sin egen ekonomiska kris, med f\u00F6rh\u00F6jd arbetsl\u00F6shet och allvarliga bankneds\u00E4ttningar som uppskattades till \u20AC940 miljarder mellan 2008 och 2012."@sv . . . . . . . . . . . "The United States subprime mortgage crisis was a multinational financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2010 that contributed to the 2007\u20132008 global financial crisis. It was triggered by a large decline in US home prices after the collapse of a housing bubble, leading to mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures, and the devaluation of housing-related securities. Declines in residential investment preceded the Great Recession and were followed by reductions in household spending and then business investment. Spending reductions were more significant in areas with a combination of high household debt and larger housing price declines."@en . . . . . . . . . . "La crisi dei subprime \u00E8 una crisi finanziaria scoppiata alla fine del 2006 negli Stati Uniti che ha avuto gravi conseguenze sull'economia mondiale, in particolar modo nei paesi sviluppati del mondo occidentale, innescando la grande recessione (da molti considerata la peggior crisi economica dai tempi della grande depressione). Prende il nome dai cosiddetti subprime, prestiti ad alto rischio finanziario erogati dagli istituti di credito in favore di clienti a forte rischio debitorio (insolvenza), considerati da molti analisti come fenomeni di eccessiva speculazione finanziaria."@it . . . . . . "Subprime hipoteken krisialdia 2007 urtean finantza merkatuetan hedaturiko krisi bat izan zen, Ameriketako Estatu Batuetan zalantzazko itzulketa zuten hipotekak finantza aktibotzat hedatu eta aurreko urteetako higiezinen burbuila lehertzean, euren nominalaren zati handi bat galdu eta aktibo toxiko bilakatu zirenak, bankuei galera handiak ekarriz. 2008 urtean hasitako krisi ekonomikoaren arrazoi nagusietako bat izan zen."@eu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Crise des subprimes"@fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "La crisis de las hipotecas subprime fue una crisis financiera por desconfianza crediticia que se extendi\u00F3 inicialmente por los mercados financieros de Estados Unidos y fue la alarma que puso en el punto de mira a las hipotecas \"basura\" de Europa desde el verano del 2007, evidenci\u00E1ndose al verano siguiente con la crisis financiera de 2008. Generalmente, se considera el detonante de la Gran Recesi\u00F3n en el plano internacional, incluyendo la burbuja inmobiliaria en Espa\u00F1a. La crisis hipotecaria, hasta octubre de 2008, se hab\u00EDa saldado con numerosas quiebras financieras, nacionalizaciones bancarias, constantes intervenciones de los bancos centrales de las principales econom\u00EDas desarrolladas, profundos descensos en las cotizaciones burs\u00E1tiles y un deterioro de la econom\u00EDa global real que ha supuesto la entrada en recesi\u00F3n de algunas de las econom\u00EDas m\u00E1s industrializadas."@es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Crisi hipotec\u00E0ria de 2007"@ca . . . . . "Subprime hipoteken krisialdia 2007 urtean finantza merkatuetan hedaturiko krisi bat izan zen, Ameriketako Estatu Batuetan zalantzazko itzulketa zuten hipotekak finantza aktibotzat hedatu eta aurreko urteetako higiezinen burbuila lehertzean, euren nominalaren zati handi bat galdu eta aktibo toxiko bilakatu zirenak, bankuei galera handiak ekarriz. 2008 urtean hasitako krisi ekonomikoaren arrazoi nagusietako bat izan zen."@eu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholders' equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked disbelief."@en . . . . . . "A crise do subprime foi uma crise financeira desencadeada em 24 de julho de 2007, a partir da queda do \u00EDndice Dow Jones motivada pela concess\u00E3o de empr\u00E9stimos hipotec\u00E1rios de alto risco (em ingl\u00EAs: subprime loan ou subprime mortgage), pr\u00E1tica que arrastou v\u00E1rios bancos para uma situa\u00E7\u00E3o de insolv\u00EAncia, repercutindo fortemente sobre as bolsas de valores de todo o mundo."@pt . . . . "The United States subprime mortgage crisis was a multinational financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2010 that contributed to the 2007\u20132008 global financial crisis. It was triggered by a large decline in US home prices after the collapse of a housing bubble, leading to mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures, and the devaluation of housing-related securities. Declines in residential investment preceded the Great Recession and were followed by reductions in household spending and then business investment. Spending reductions were more significant in areas with a combination of high household debt and larger housing price declines. The housing bubble preceding the crisis was financed with mortgage-backed securities (MBSes) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which initially offered higher interest rates (i.e. better returns) than government securities, along with attractive risk ratings from rating agencies. While elements of the crisis first became more visible during 2007, several major financial institutions collapsed in September 2008, with significant disruption in the flow of credit to businesses and consumers and the onset of a severe global recession. There were many causes of the crisis, with commentators assigning different levels of blame to financial institutions, regulators, credit agencies, government housing policies, and consumers, among others. Two proximate causes were the rise in subprime lending and the increase in housing speculation. The percentage of lower-quality subprime mortgages originated during a given year rose from the historical 8% or lower range to approximately 20% from 2004 to 2006, with much higher ratios in some parts of the U.S. A high percentage of these subprime mortgages, over 90% in 2006 for example, had an interest rate that increased over time. Housing speculation also increased, with the share of mortgage originations to investors (i.e. those owning homes other than primary residences) rising significantly from around 20% in 2000 to around 35% in 2006\u20132007. Investors, even those with prime credit ratings, were much more likely to default than non-investors when prices fell. These changes were part of a broader trend of lowered lending standards and higher-risk mortgage products, which contributed to U.S. households becoming increasingly indebted. The ratio of household debt to disposable personal income rose from 77% in 1990 to 127% by the end of 2007. When U.S. home prices declined steeply after peaking in mid-2006, it became more difficult for borrowers to refinance their loans. As adjustable-rate mortgages began to reset at higher interest rates (causing higher monthly payments), mortgage delinquencies soared. Securities backed with mortgages, including subprime mortgages, widely held by financial firms globally, lost most of their value. Global investors also drastically reduced purchases of mortgage-backed debt and other securities as part of a decline in the capacity and willingness of the private financial system to support lending. Concerns about the soundness of U.S. credit and financial markets led to tightening credit around the world and slowing economic growth in the U.S. and Europe. The crisis had severe, long-lasting consequences for the U.S. and European economies. The U.S. entered a deep recession, with nearly 9 million jobs lost during 2008 and 2009, roughly 6% of the workforce. The number of jobs did not return to the December 2007 pre-crisis peak until May 2014. U.S. household net worth declined by nearly $13 trillion (20%) from its Q2 2007 pre-crisis peak, recovering by Q4 2012. U.S. housing prices fell nearly 30% on average and the U.S. stock market fell approximately 50% by early 2009, with stocks regaining their December 2007 level during September 2012. One estimate of lost output and income from the crisis comes to \"at least 40% of 2007 gross domestic product\". Europe also continued to struggle with its own economic crisis, with elevated unemployment and severe banking impairments estimated at \u20AC940 billion between 2008 and 2012. As of January 2018, U.S. bailout funds had been fully recovered by the government, when interest on loans is taken into consideration. A total of $626B was invested, loaned, or granted due to various bailout measures, while $390B had been returned to the Treasury. The Treasury had earned another $323B in interest on bailout loans, resulting in an $109B profit as of January 2021."@en . . . . . . . . . "Americk\u00E1 krize trhu s hypot\u00E9kami, kter\u00E1 v \u010Dervenci a srpnu 2007 vy\u00FAstila ve finan\u010Dn\u00ED propad burzovn\u00EDch trh\u016F v USA, byla zp\u016Fsobena rizikov\u00FDmi hypote\u010Dn\u00EDmi \u00FAv\u011Bry. Kv\u016Fli propojenosti trh\u016F se tato krize rychle p\u0159elila do cel\u00E9ho sv\u011Bta a nakonec p\u0159erostla ve sv\u011Btovou finan\u010Dn\u00ED krizi."@cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "2019-04-22"^^ . . . 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