. "Long-Term Capital Management L. P. (LTCM) byl hedge fond, kter\u00FD zalo\u017Eil John Meriwether (b\u00FDval\u00FD m\u00EDstop\u0159edseda a zodpov\u011Bdn\u00E1 osoba za obchodov\u00E1n\u00ED s dluhopisy u ). Mezi \u0159editeli fondu byli i nositel\u00E9 Nobelovy ceny za ekonomii Myron Scholes a Robert C. Merton, kte\u0159\u00ED obdr\u017Eeli tuto cenu za rok 1997. Dal\u0161\u00ED zn\u00E1mou osobnost\u00ED byl David Mullins, b\u00FDval\u00FD \u010Dlen Fedu. Aktivity fondu ohrozily na konci dvac\u00E1t\u00E9ho stolet\u00ED finan\u010Dn\u00ED syst\u00E9m. Master hedge fond s n\u00E1zvem zkolaboval na konci 20. stolet\u00ED a vedl k dohod\u011B z 23. z\u00E1\u0159\u00ED, kterou uzav\u0159elo 16 (n\u011Bkde je uv\u00E1d\u011Bn po\u010Det 15 \u2013 ) velk\u00FDch finan\u010Dn\u00EDch instituc\u00ED, mezi nimi , Barclays, Bear Stearns, , Cr\u00E9dit Agricole, , Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas, , Soci\u00E9t\u00E9 G\u00E9n\u00E9rale, a UBS a to v\u0161e pod dohledem FED. LTCM spravoval finance asi 100 z\u00E1kazn\u00EDk\u016F, pracovalo pro n\u011Bj zhruba 200 zam\u011Bstnanc\u016F a spravoval kapit\u00E1l ve v\u00FD\u0161i 126 miliard USD. Vstupn\u00ED poplatek do fondu \u010Dinil 10 mil USD. Investor\u016Fm nebylo povoleno si vybrat po t\u0159i roky pen\u00EDze ani jim nebylo dovoleno z\u00EDskat informace t\u00FDkaj\u00EDc\u00ED se typu investice LTCM. Do fondu investovalo velk\u00E9 mno\u017Estv\u00ED bank a penzijn\u00EDch fond\u016F. Strategie LTCM byla jeho z\u00E1stupci popisov\u00E1na jako zam\u011B\u0159en\u00ED se na p\u0159\u00EDle\u017Eitosti k cenov\u00FDm arbitr\u00E1\u017E\u00EDm, vyu\u017E\u00EDv\u00E1n\u00ED kr\u00E1tkodob\u00FDch tr\u017En\u00EDch anom\u00E1li\u00ED relativn\u011B k dlouhodob\u00FDm rovnov\u00E1\u017En\u00FDm cen\u00E1m, atd. Jeho n\u00E1strojem k vysok\u00FDm zisk\u016F a n\u00E1sledn\u011B i n\u00E1strojem jeho zk\u00E1zy bylo vyu\u017E\u00EDv\u00E1n\u00ED \"vysok\u00E9 p\u00E1ky\". Argumentem pro vysokou p\u00E1ku bylo to, \u017Ee investice fondu jsou velmi m\u00E1lo rizikov\u00E9 \u2013 v principu zaji\u0161t\u011Bn\u00E9 (tedy skute\u010Dn\u011B \u201Chedged\u201D) vyu\u017E\u00EDv\u00E1n\u00EDm m\u00E1lorizikov\u00FDch p\u0159\u00EDle\u017Eitost\u00ED k arbitr\u00E1\u017Ei (Myron Scholes \u00FAdajn\u011B p\u0159irovn\u00E1val operace LTCM k obrovsk\u00E9mu vysava\u010Di, kter\u00FD soustavn\u011B vys\u00E1v\u00E1 drobn\u00E9 z trh\u016F po cel\u00E9m sv\u011Bt\u011B)."@cs . . . "1994"^^ . . . . . . "250"^^ . "Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) was a highly-leveraged hedge fund. In 1998, it received a $3.6 billion bailout from a group of 14 banks, in a deal brokered and put together by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. LTCM was founded in 1994 by John Meriwether, the former vice-chairman and head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers. Members of LTCM's board of directors included Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who three years later in 1997 shared the Nobel Prize in Economics for having developed the Black\u2013Scholes model of financial dynamics."@en . . . . . "Long Term Capital Management"@fr . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) war ein 1994 von John Meriwether (fr\u00FCherer Vize-Chef und Leiter des Renten\u00ADhandels bei Salomon Brothers) gegr\u00FCndeter Hedgefonds. Unter den Direktoren waren auch Myron S. Scholes und Robert Carhart Merton, denen 1997 der Alfred-Nobel-Ged\u00E4chtnispreis f\u00FCr Wirtschaftswissenschaften verliehen wurde. Die Schieflage des Fonds 1998 bedrohte das internationale Finanzsystem; eine Finanzkrise konnte durch eine Rettungsaktion abgewendet werden, und der Fonds wurde bis 2000 endg\u00FCltig aufgel\u00F6st."@de . . . "44810"^^ . . . . . "January 2018"@en . . . "Long-Term Capital Management LP (LTCM; \u0434\u043E\u0441\u043B\u043E\u0432\u043D\u043E: \u00AB\u0414\u043E\u043B\u0433\u043E\u0441\u0440\u043E\u0447\u043D\u043E\u0435 \u0443\u043F\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435 \u043A\u0430\u043F\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C\u00BB) \u2014 \u043D\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044E\u0449\u0430\u044F \u043D\u044B\u043D\u0435 \u043A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u044F, \u0443\u043F\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043B\u044F\u0432\u0448\u0430\u044F \u0445\u0435\u0434\u0436-\u0444\u043E\u043D\u0434\u043E\u043C, \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043F\u043E\u043B\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0432\u0448\u0430\u044F\u0441\u044F \u0432 \u0413\u0440\u0438\u043D\u0443\u0438\u0447\u0435, \u0448\u0442\u0430\u0442 \u041A\u043E\u043D\u043D\u0435\u043A\u0442\u0438\u043A\u0443\u0442. LTCM \u0438\u0441\u043F\u043E\u043B\u044C\u0437\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0442\u043E\u0440\u0433\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0438 \u0441 \u0432 \u0441\u043E\u0447\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0438\u0438 \u0441 \u0432\u044B\u0441\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u044B\u043C \u0440\u044B\u0447\u0430\u0433\u043E\u043C. \u041A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u044F \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0430 \u043E\u0441\u043D\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D\u0430 \u0432 1994 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0443 , \u0431\u044B\u0432\u0448\u0438\u043C \u0432\u0438\u0446\u0435-\u043F\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043C \u0438 \u0440\u0443\u043A\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043C \u043E\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043B\u0430 \u0442\u043E\u0440\u0433\u043E\u0432\u043B\u0438 \u043E\u0431\u043B\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044F\u043C\u0438 Salomon Brothers. \u0427\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0438 \u0441\u043E\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0434\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043A\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u0432 LTCM \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0438 \u041C\u0430\u0439\u0440\u043E\u043D \u0428\u043E\u0443\u043B\u0437 \u0438 \u0420\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0440\u0442 \u041C\u0435\u0440\u0442\u043E\u043D, \u043F\u043E\u043B\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0435 \u0432 1997 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0443 \u041D\u043E\u0431\u0435\u043B\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043A\u0443\u044E \u043F\u0440\u0435\u043C\u0438\u044E \u043F\u043E \u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u043A\u0435 \u0441 \u0444\u043E\u0440\u043C\u0443\u043B\u0438\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u00AB\u0437\u0430 \u043D\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0439 \u043C\u0435\u0442\u043E\u0434 \u043E\u043F\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0438\u044F \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0438\u043C\u043E\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043E\u0432\u00BB."@ru . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management L. P. (LTCM) byl hedge fond, kter\u00FD zalo\u017Eil John Meriwether (b\u00FDval\u00FD m\u00EDstop\u0159edseda a zodpov\u011Bdn\u00E1 osoba za obchodov\u00E1n\u00ED s dluhopisy u ). Mezi \u0159editeli fondu byli i nositel\u00E9 Nobelovy ceny za ekonomii Myron Scholes a Robert C. Merton, kte\u0159\u00ED obdr\u017Eeli tuto cenu za rok 1997. Dal\u0161\u00ED zn\u00E1mou osobnost\u00ED byl David Mullins, b\u00FDval\u00FD \u010Dlen Fedu. Aktivity fondu ohrozily na konci dvac\u00E1t\u00E9ho stolet\u00ED finan\u010Dn\u00ED syst\u00E9m. Master hedge fond s n\u00E1zvem zkolaboval na konci 20. stolet\u00ED a vedl k dohod\u011B z 23. z\u00E1\u0159\u00ED, kterou uzav\u0159elo 16 (n\u011Bkde je uv\u00E1d\u011Bn po\u010Det 15 \u2013 ) velk\u00FDch finan\u010Dn\u00EDch instituc\u00ED, mezi nimi , Barclays, Bear Stearns, , Cr\u00E9dit Agricole, , Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, BNP Paribas, , Soci\u00E9t\u00E9 G\u00E9n\u00E9rale, a UBS a to v\u0161e pod dohlede"@cs . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@it . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was een hedgefonds dat failliet ging in 1998, ondanks het feit dat verschillende Nobelprijswinnaars aan het roer stonden. Het hedgefonds werd in 1994 opgericht door John Meriwether, het voormalig hoofd van de obligatiehandel van de bank . Mede aan het roer stonden de Nobelprijswinnaars Myron Scholes en Robert C. Merton. Het fonds richtte zich op het benutten van kleine prijsverschillen tussen verschillende gerelateerde obligaties. Deze arbitragehandel levert rendement op ongeacht de richting van de beurs. Omdat de prijsverschillen klein waren werd grootschalig ingezet met een hefboomwerking (leverage)."@nl . . . . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@en . . . . . . . . "\uB871\uD140 \uCE90\uD53C\uD0C8 \uB9E4\uB2C8\uC9C0\uBA3C\uD2B8(Long-Term Capital Management; LTCM)\uB294 1994\uB144, \uC758 \uBD80\uC0AC\uC7A5\uC774\uC790 \uCC44\uAD8C\uAC70\uB798\uD300\uC7A5\uC774\uC5C8\uB358 \uAC00 \uC124\uB9BD\uD55C \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC758 \uD5E4\uC9C0\uD380\uB4DC\uC600\uB2E4."@ko . "Long-Term Capital Management LP (LTCM; \u0434\u043E\u0441\u043B\u043E\u0432\u043D\u043E: \u00AB\u0414\u043E\u043B\u0433\u043E\u0441\u0440\u043E\u0447\u043D\u043E\u0435 \u0443\u043F\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0438\u0435 \u043A\u0430\u043F\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043B\u043E\u043C\u00BB) \u2014 \u043D\u0435\u0441\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044E\u0449\u0430\u044F \u043D\u044B\u043D\u0435 \u043A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u044F, \u0443\u043F\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043B\u044F\u0432\u0448\u0430\u044F \u0445\u0435\u0434\u0436-\u0444\u043E\u043D\u0434\u043E\u043C, \u0440\u0430\u0441\u043F\u043E\u043B\u0430\u0433\u0430\u0432\u0448\u0430\u044F\u0441\u044F \u0432 \u0413\u0440\u0438\u043D\u0443\u0438\u0447\u0435, \u0448\u0442\u0430\u0442 \u041A\u043E\u043D\u043D\u0435\u043A\u0442\u0438\u043A\u0443\u0442. LTCM \u0438\u0441\u043F\u043E\u043B\u044C\u0437\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0442\u043E\u0440\u0433\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0435 \u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u0442\u0435\u0433\u0438\u0438 \u0441 \u0432 \u0441\u043E\u0447\u0435\u0442\u0430\u043D\u0438\u0438 \u0441 \u0432\u044B\u0441\u043E\u043A\u0438\u043C \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u044B\u043C \u0440\u044B\u0447\u0430\u0433\u043E\u043C. \u041A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u044F \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0430 \u043E\u0441\u043D\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D\u0430 \u0432 1994 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0443 , \u0431\u044B\u0432\u0448\u0438\u043C \u0432\u0438\u0446\u0435-\u043F\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0435\u0434\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043C \u0438 \u0440\u0443\u043A\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043C \u043E\u0442\u0434\u0435\u043B\u0430 \u0442\u043E\u0440\u0433\u043E\u0432\u043B\u0438 \u043E\u0431\u043B\u0438\u0433\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044F\u043C\u0438 Salomon Brothers. \u0427\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0430\u043C\u0438 \u0441\u043E\u0432\u0435\u0442\u0430 \u0434\u0438\u0440\u0435\u043A\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u0432 LTCM \u0431\u044B\u043B\u0438 \u041C\u0430\u0439\u0440\u043E\u043D \u0428\u043E\u0443\u043B\u0437 \u0438 \u0420\u043E\u0431\u0435\u0440\u0442 \u041C\u0435\u0440\u0442\u043E\u043D, \u043F\u043E\u043B\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0432\u0448\u0438\u0435 \u0432 1997 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0443 \u041D\u043E\u0431\u0435\u043B\u0435\u0432\u0441\u043A\u0443\u044E \u043F\u0440\u0435\u043C\u0438\u044E \u043F\u043E \u044D\u043A\u043E\u043D\u043E\u043C\u0438\u043A\u0435 \u0441 \u0444\u043E\u0440\u043C\u0443\u043B\u0438\u0440\u043E\u0432\u043A\u043E\u0439 \u00AB\u0437\u0430 \u043D\u043E\u0432\u044B\u0439 \u043C\u0435\u0442\u043E\u0434 \u043E\u043F\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0435\u043B\u0435\u043D\u0438\u044F \u0441\u0442\u043E\u0438\u043C\u043E\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0434\u0435\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0430\u0442\u0438\u0432\u043E\u0432\u00BB. \u0418\u0437\u043D\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043B\u044C\u043D\u043E \u043A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u044F \u043F\u043E\u043A\u0430\u0437\u044B\u0432\u0430\u043B\u0430 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u043E\u0432\u0443\u044E \u0434\u043E\u0445\u043E\u0434\u043D\u043E\u0441\u0442\u044C \u0441\u0432\u044B\u0448\u0435 21 % \u043F\u043E\u0441\u043B\u0435 \u0443\u043F\u043B\u0430\u0442\u044B \u043D\u0430\u043B\u043E\u0433\u043E\u0432 \u0432 \u043F\u0435\u0440\u0432\u044B\u0439 \u0433\u043E\u0434, 43 % \u2014 \u0432\u043E \u0432\u0442\u043E\u0440\u043E\u0439 \u0433\u043E\u0434 \u0438 41 % \u2014 \u0432 \u0442\u0440\u0435\u0442\u0438\u0439 \u0433\u043E\u0434. \u041E\u0434\u043D\u0430\u043A\u043E \u0432 1998 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0443 \u043E\u043D\u0430 \u043F\u043E\u0442\u0435\u0440\u044F\u043B\u0430 4,6 \u043C\u043B\u0440\u0434 \u0434\u043E\u043B\u043B\u0430\u0440\u043E\u0432 \u0421\u0428\u0410 \u043C\u0435\u043D\u0435\u0435 \u0447\u0435\u043C \u0437\u0430 \u0447\u0435\u0442\u044B\u0440\u0435 \u043C\u0435\u0441\u044F\u0446\u0430 \u043F\u043E\u0441\u043B\u0435 \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u043E\u0433\u043E \u043A\u0440\u0438\u0437\u0438\u0441\u0430 \u0432 \u0410\u0437\u0438\u0438 1997 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0430 \u0438 \u0440\u043E\u0441\u0441\u0438\u0439\u0441\u043A\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0434\u0435\u0444\u043E\u043B\u0442\u0430 1998 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0430. \u0423\u043F\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043B\u044F\u0435\u043C\u044B\u0439 \u043A\u043E\u043C\u043F\u0430\u043D\u0438\u0435\u0439 \u0445\u0435\u0434\u0436-\u0444\u043E\u043D\u0434 Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P. \u0440\u0443\u0445\u043D\u0443\u043B \u0432 \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0446\u0435 1990-\u0445 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u043E\u0432, \u0447\u0442\u043E \u043F\u0440\u0438\u0432\u0435\u043B\u043E \u043A \u0441\u043E\u0433\u043B\u0430\u0448\u0435\u043D\u0438\u044E \u043E\u0442 23 \u0441\u0435\u043D\u0442\u044F\u0431\u0440\u044F 1998 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0430 \u043C\u0435\u0436\u0434\u0443 14 \u0444\u0438\u043D\u0430\u043D\u0441\u043E\u0432\u044B\u043C\u0438 \u0438\u043D\u0441\u0442\u0438\u0442\u0443\u0442\u0430\u043C\u0438, \u0441\u0440\u0435\u0434\u0438 \u043A\u043E\u0442\u043E\u0440\u044B\u0445: Bankers Trust, Barclays, Chase Manhattan Bank, Cr\u00E9dit Agricole, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Paribas, Salomon Smith Barney, Soci\u00E9t\u00E9 G\u00E9n\u00E9rale \u0438 UBS \u2014 \u043E \u0440\u0435\u043A\u0430\u043F\u0438\u0442\u0430\u043B\u0438\u0437\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0432 \u0440\u0430\u0437\u043C\u0435\u0440\u0435 3,6 \u043C\u043B\u0440\u0434 \u0434\u043E\u043B\u043B\u0430\u0440\u043E\u0432 \u043F\u043E\u0434 \u043A\u043E\u043D\u0442\u0440\u043E\u043B\u0435\u043C \u0424\u0435\u0434\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043B\u044C\u043D\u043E\u0433\u043E \u0440\u0435\u0437\u0435\u0440\u0432\u0430. \u0424\u043E\u043D\u0434 \u0431\u044B\u043B \u043E\u043A\u043E\u043D\u0447\u0430\u0442\u0435\u043B\u044C\u043D\u043E \u043B\u0438\u043A\u0432\u0438\u0434\u0438\u0440\u043E\u0432\u0430\u043D \u0432 \u043D\u0430\u0447\u0430\u043B\u0435 2000 \u0433\u043E\u0434\u0430."@ru . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\uB871\uD140 \uCE90\uD53C\uD0C8 \uB9E4\uB2C8\uC9C0\uBA3C\uD2B8(Long-Term Capital Management; LTCM)\uB294 1994\uB144, \uC758 \uBD80\uC0AC\uC7A5\uC774\uC790 \uCC44\uAD8C\uAC70\uB798\uD300\uC7A5\uC774\uC5C8\uB358 \uAC00 \uC124\uB9BD\uD55C \uBBF8\uAD6D\uC758 \uD5E4\uC9C0\uD380\uB4DC\uC600\uB2E4."@ko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "\u30ED\u30F3\u30B0\u30BF\u30FC\u30E0\u30AD\u30E3\u30D4\u30BF\u30EB\u30DE\u30CD\u30B8\u30E1\u30F3\u30C8\uFF08\u82F1\u8A9E\uFF1ALong-Term Capital Management\u3001\u7565\u79F0\uFF1ALTCM\uFF09\u306F\u30011994\u5E74\u304B\u30891999\u5E74\u307E\u3067\u5B58\u5728\u3057\u305F\u30D8\u30C3\u30B8\u30D5\u30A1\u30F3\u30C9\u3002 \u304B\u3064\u3066\u30B3\u30CD\u30C1\u30AB\u30C3\u30C8\u5DDE\u306B\u672C\u90E8\u3092\u304A\u3044\u3066\u3044\u305F\u3002\u904B\u7528\u30C1\u30FC\u30E0\u306B\u30CE\u30FC\u30D9\u30EB\u7D4C\u6E08\u5B66\u8CDE\u53D7\u8CDE\u8005\u3089\u3092\u96C6\u3081\u3001\u9AD8\u5EA6\u306A\u91D1\u878D\u5DE5\u5B66\u7406\u8AD6\u3092\u99C6\u4F7F\u3057\u3066\u3001\u7D44\u6210\u304B\u3089\u6570\u5E74\u306F\u9A5A\u7570\u7684\u306A\u6210\u7E3E\u3092\u8A18\u9332\u3057\u305F\u3002\u3057\u304B\u3057\u53D6\u5F15\u50B5\u5238\u306E\u308F\u305A\u304B\u306A\u91D1\u5229\u5DEE\u304B\u3089\u53CE\u76CA\u3092\u5F97\u308B\u305F\u3081\u306B\u5DE8\u5927\u306A\u30EC\u30D0\u30EC\u30C3\u30B8\u3092\u304B\u3051\u3066\u3044\u305F\u305F\u3081\u3001\u30A2\u30B8\u30A2\u901A\u8CA8\u5371\u6A5F\u306E\u7D50\u679C\u8D77\u304D\u305F\u5E02\u5834\u306E\u5927\u5909\u52D5\u3092\u5438\u53CE\u3057\u304D\u308C\u305A\u7834\u7DBB\u3057\u305F\u3002"@ja . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@ru . . . . . "Il fondo Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) era un fondo speculativo nel cui board figuravano grandi protagonisti del mondo economico. L'economista Myron Scholes Fu istituito nel 1994 da John Meriwether e il suo team proveniente dalla Salomon Brothers e si bas\u00F2 sui modelli matematici creati dagli associati gi\u00E0 premi Nobel Robert C. Merton e Myron Scholes. Compiva, perlopi\u00F9, operazioni di arbitraggio economico. Vi lavorarono anche , , , William Krasker, Dick Leahy, , James McEntee, Robert Shustak, ."@it . . "1118406199"^^ . "\uB871\uD140\uCE90\uD53C\uD138\uB9E4\uB2C8\uC9C0\uBA3C\uD2B8"@ko . . "Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) war ein 1994 von John Meriwether (fr\u00FCherer Vize-Chef und Leiter des Renten\u00ADhandels bei Salomon Brothers) gegr\u00FCndeter Hedgefonds. Unter den Direktoren waren auch Myron S. Scholes und Robert Carhart Merton, denen 1997 der Alfred-Nobel-Ged\u00E4chtnispreis f\u00FCr Wirtschaftswissenschaften verliehen wurde. Die Schieflage des Fonds 1998 bedrohte das internationale Finanzsystem; eine Finanzkrise konnte durch eine Rettungsaktion abgewendet werden, und der Fonds wurde bis 2000 endg\u00FCltig aufgel\u00F6st."@de . . . . . . . . . . "1994"^^ . . "18673"^^ . . . . . "\u957F\u671F\u8D44\u672C\u7BA1\u7406\u516C\u53F8"@zh . . . . . . . . . "yes"@en . . . . . "\u30ED\u30F3\u30B0\u30BF\u30FC\u30E0\u30FB\u30AD\u30E3\u30D4\u30BF\u30EB\u30FB\u30DE\u30CD\u30B8\u30E1\u30F3\u30C8"@ja . "1998"^^ . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@de . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) was a highly-leveraged hedge fund. In 1998, it received a $3.6 billion bailout from a group of 14 banks, in a deal brokered and put together by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. LTCM was founded in 1994 by John Meriwether, the former vice-chairman and head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers. Members of LTCM's board of directors included Myron Scholes and Robert C. Merton, who three years later in 1997 shared the Nobel Prize in Economics for having developed the Black\u2013Scholes model of financial dynamics. LTCM was initially successful, with annualized returns (after fees) of around 21% in its first year, 43% in its second year and 41% in its third year. However, in 1998 it lost $4.6 billion in less than four months due to a combination of high leverage and exposure to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and 1998 Russian financial crisis. The master hedge fund, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P., collapsed soon thereafter, leading to an agreement on September 23, 1998, among 14 financial institutions for a $3.65 billion recapitalization under the supervision of the Federal Reserve. The fund was liquidated and dissolved in early 2000. LTCM can also be described as using an absolute return strategy in combination with high leverage."@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@nl . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@cs . . . . . . . . . . "\u9577\u671F\u8CC7\u672C\u7BA1\u7406\u516C\u53F8\uFF08\u82F1\u8A9E\uFF1ALong-Term Capital Management L.P., \u7E2E\u5BEB\u70BA LTCM\uFF09\u662F\u4E00\u500B\u6295\u6A5F\u6027\u907F\u96AA\u57FA\u91D1\uFF0C\u5C08\u9580\u5F9E\u4E8B\u5229\u7528\u9AD8\u69D3\u687F\u7684\u7D55\u5C0D\u5831\u916C\u4EA4\u6613\u7B56\u7565(\u4F8B\u5982\u56FA\u5B9A\u6536\u76CA\u5957\u5229\u3001\u7D71\u8A08\u5957\u5229\u548C\u914D\u5C0D\u4EA4\u6613\u7B49)\uFF0C\u7E3D\u90E8\u8A2D\u7F6E\u65BC\u7F8E\u570B\u5EB7\u4E43\u72C4\u514B\u5DDE\u683C\u6797\u5A01\u6CBB\u3002\u8A72\u516C\u53F8\u7684\u907F\u96AA\u57FA\u91D1\uFF0C\u9577\u671F\u8CC7\u7522\u6295\u8CC7\u7D44\u5408(Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P.)\uFF0C\u572890\u5E74\u4EE3\u665A\u671F\u906D\u9022\u5931\u6557\uFF0C\u5728\u7F8E\u570B\u806F\u6E96\u6703\u7684\u76E3\u7763\u4E4B\u4E0B\u63A5\u53D7\u5176\u4ED6\u91D1\u878D\u6A5F\u69CB\u7684\u63F4\u52A9\u3002 LTCM\u662F\u7531\u6240\u7F85\u9580\u5144\u5F1F\u7684\u524D\u526F\u8463\u4E8B\u9577\u66A8\u50B5\u5238\u4EA4\u6613\u90E8\u4E3B\u7BA1\u65BC1994\u5E74\u6210\u7ACB\uFF0C\u8463\u4E8B\u6703\u6210\u54E1\u5305\u62EC\u4E86\u56E0\u5236\u5B9A\u671F\u6B0A\u5B9A\u50F9\u516C\u5F0F\uFF0C\u800C\u57281997\u5E74\u5171\u540C\u7372\u5F97\u8AFE\u8C9D\u723E\u7D93\u6FDF\u5B78\u734E\u7684\u9EA5\u502B\u00B7\u4F11\u65AF\u548C\u7F57\u4F2F\u7279\u00B7C\u00B7\u9ED8\u987F\u3002LTCM\u5728\u6210\u7ACB\u7B2C\u4E00\u5E74\u5C31\u7372\u5F97\u4E86\u5E74\u5316\u5831\u916C\u7387\u8D85\u904E40%\u7684\u5DE8\u5927\u6210\u529F\uFF0C\u7136\u800C\u57281998\u5E74\u4FC4\u7F85\u65AF\u91D1\u878D\u5371\u6A5F\u5F8C\uFF0C\u537B\u5728\u4E0D\u5230\u56DB\u500B\u6708\u7684\u6642\u9593\u88E1\u9020\u6210\u4E8646\u5104\u7F8E\u5143\u7684\u5DE8\u5927\u8667\u640D\uFF0C\u4E0D\u5F97\u4E0D\u8ACB\u6C42\u7F8E\u570B\u806F\u6E96\u6703\u7684\u8CA1\u653F\u4ECB\u5165\u3002\u4E0D\u4E45\u4E4B\u5F8C\uFF0C\u8A72\u57FA\u91D1\u57282000\u5E74\u521D\u5012\u9589\u3002"@zh . . . . . . "Il fondo Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) era un fondo speculativo nel cui board figuravano grandi protagonisti del mondo economico. L'economista Myron Scholes Fu istituito nel 1994 da John Meriwether e il suo team proveniente dalla Salomon Brothers e si bas\u00F2 sui modelli matematici creati dagli associati gi\u00E0 premi Nobel Robert C. Merton e Myron Scholes. Compiva, perlopi\u00F9, operazioni di arbitraggio economico. Vi lavorarono anche , , , William Krasker, Dick Leahy, , James McEntee, Robert Shustak, . Possedeva un capitale gestito di 4 miliardi di dollari ma, tramite leve finanziarie molto ampie, oper\u00F2 con esposizioni in alcuni casi sino a 1200 miliardi di dollari. Nei primi anni riusc\u00EC a produrre rendimenti netti annui di circa il 40%. Numerosi erano i gestori che replicavano le strategie di investimento di LTCM, col risultato che alcuni errori commessi dal fondo sono stati effettuati anche da chi utilizzava le medesime strategie. Tutto questo, unitamente alla crisi della Russia e al grande utilizzo della leva finanziaria da parte di LTCM, ha reso il suo collasso drammatico nel 1998, richiedendo l'intervento diretto della Federal reserve a sostegno, al fine di evitare il peggio. Dopo LTCM, Meriwether nel 2000 ha lanciato , insieme ad Haghani, Hilibrand, Leahy, e Rosenfeld, operando con gli stessi modelli matematici sebbene con esposizioni finanziarie minori."@it . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) fue un fondo de inversi\u00F3n libre de car\u00E1cter especulativo\u200B con sede en Greenwich, Connecticut, Estados Unidos, que utiliz\u00F3 estrategias comerciales de retorno absoluto (como el , y el ) combinadas con un elevado apalancamiento. El principal fondo de inversi\u00F3n libre de la entidad, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P., quebr\u00F3 a finales de la d\u00E9cada de 1990 y tuvo que ser rescatado por otras entidades financieras bajo la supervisi\u00F3n de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos.\u200B"@es . . . . . . . . . "Long Term Capital Management est un fonds sp\u00E9culatif apparu en 1994 et dont la quasi-faillite en 1998 fit courir un risque majeur au syst\u00E8me bancaire international et cr\u00E9a des perturbations importantes sur les march\u00E9s financiers."@fr . . . . . "\u9577\u671F\u8CC7\u672C\u7BA1\u7406\u516C\u53F8\uFF08\u82F1\u8A9E\uFF1ALong-Term Capital Management L.P., \u7E2E\u5BEB\u70BA LTCM\uFF09\u662F\u4E00\u500B\u6295\u6A5F\u6027\u907F\u96AA\u57FA\u91D1\uFF0C\u5C08\u9580\u5F9E\u4E8B\u5229\u7528\u9AD8\u69D3\u687F\u7684\u7D55\u5C0D\u5831\u916C\u4EA4\u6613\u7B56\u7565(\u4F8B\u5982\u56FA\u5B9A\u6536\u76CA\u5957\u5229\u3001\u7D71\u8A08\u5957\u5229\u548C\u914D\u5C0D\u4EA4\u6613\u7B49)\uFF0C\u7E3D\u90E8\u8A2D\u7F6E\u65BC\u7F8E\u570B\u5EB7\u4E43\u72C4\u514B\u5DDE\u683C\u6797\u5A01\u6CBB\u3002\u8A72\u516C\u53F8\u7684\u907F\u96AA\u57FA\u91D1\uFF0C\u9577\u671F\u8CC7\u7522\u6295\u8CC7\u7D44\u5408(Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P.)\uFF0C\u572890\u5E74\u4EE3\u665A\u671F\u906D\u9022\u5931\u6557\uFF0C\u5728\u7F8E\u570B\u806F\u6E96\u6703\u7684\u76E3\u7763\u4E4B\u4E0B\u63A5\u53D7\u5176\u4ED6\u91D1\u878D\u6A5F\u69CB\u7684\u63F4\u52A9\u3002 LTCM\u662F\u7531\u6240\u7F85\u9580\u5144\u5F1F\u7684\u524D\u526F\u8463\u4E8B\u9577\u66A8\u50B5\u5238\u4EA4\u6613\u90E8\u4E3B\u7BA1\u65BC1994\u5E74\u6210\u7ACB\uFF0C\u8463\u4E8B\u6703\u6210\u54E1\u5305\u62EC\u4E86\u56E0\u5236\u5B9A\u671F\u6B0A\u5B9A\u50F9\u516C\u5F0F\uFF0C\u800C\u57281997\u5E74\u5171\u540C\u7372\u5F97\u8AFE\u8C9D\u723E\u7D93\u6FDF\u5B78\u734E\u7684\u9EA5\u502B\u00B7\u4F11\u65AF\u548C\u7F57\u4F2F\u7279\u00B7C\u00B7\u9ED8\u987F\u3002LTCM\u5728\u6210\u7ACB\u7B2C\u4E00\u5E74\u5C31\u7372\u5F97\u4E86\u5E74\u5316\u5831\u916C\u7387\u8D85\u904E40%\u7684\u5DE8\u5927\u6210\u529F\uFF0C\u7136\u800C\u57281998\u5E74\u4FC4\u7F85\u65AF\u91D1\u878D\u5371\u6A5F\u5F8C\uFF0C\u537B\u5728\u4E0D\u5230\u56DB\u500B\u6708\u7684\u6642\u9593\u88E1\u9020\u6210\u4E8646\u5104\u7F8E\u5143\u7684\u5DE8\u5927\u8667\u640D\uFF0C\u4E0D\u5F97\u4E0D\u8ACB\u6C42\u7F8E\u570B\u806F\u6E96\u6703\u7684\u8CA1\u653F\u4ECB\u5165\u3002\u4E0D\u4E45\u4E4B\u5F8C\uFF0C\u8A72\u57FA\u91D1\u57282000\u5E74\u521D\u5012\u9589\u3002"@zh . . . . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was een hedgefonds dat failliet ging in 1998, ondanks het feit dat verschillende Nobelprijswinnaars aan het roer stonden. Het hedgefonds werd in 1994 opgericht door John Meriwether, het voormalig hoofd van de obligatiehandel van de bank . Mede aan het roer stonden de Nobelprijswinnaars Myron Scholes en Robert C. Merton. Het fonds richtte zich op het benutten van kleine prijsverschillen tussen verschillende gerelateerde obligaties. Deze arbitragehandel levert rendement op ongeacht de richting van de beurs. Omdat de prijsverschillen klein waren werd grootschalig ingezet met een hefboomwerking (leverage). De eerste jaren van het fonds leverden een rendement op van ongeveer 40% gemiddeld per jaar. LTCM kreeg meer kapitaal te investeren en richtte zich naast de obligaties ook op andere soorten arbitrage en de optiehandel. In 1998 had LTCM een eigen vermogen van 4,72 miljard dollar en 124,5 miljard dollar geleend."@nl . . . . . "Long Term Capital Management est un fonds sp\u00E9culatif apparu en 1994 et dont la quasi-faillite en 1998 fit courir un risque majeur au syst\u00E8me bancaire international et cr\u00E9a des perturbations importantes sur les march\u00E9s financiers."@fr . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management L.P. (LTCM) fue un fondo de inversi\u00F3n libre de car\u00E1cter especulativo\u200B con sede en Greenwich, Connecticut, Estados Unidos, que utiliz\u00F3 estrategias comerciales de retorno absoluto (como el , y el ) combinadas con un elevado apalancamiento. El principal fondo de inversi\u00F3n libre de la entidad, Long-Term Capital Portfolio L.P., quebr\u00F3 a finales de la d\u00E9cada de 1990 y tuvo que ser rescatado por otras entidades financieras bajo la supervisi\u00F3n de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos.\u200B LTCM fue fundado en 1994 por , antiguo vicepresidente y jefe de ventas de bonos en Salomon Brothers. La junta directiva inclu\u00EDa a personas como Myron Scholes y Robert C. Merton, quienes compartieron el Premio en Ciencias Econ\u00F3micas en memoria de Alfred Nobel en 1997 por \"un nuevo m\u00E9todo para determinar el valor de los derivados\".\u200B El fondo result\u00F3 un \u00E9xito en sus inicios, con retornos de un 40% neto para los inversores en sus primeros a\u00F1os, pero en 1998 perdi\u00F3 4600 millones de d\u00F3lares en menos de cuatro meses como consecuencia de la crisis financiera rusa, provocando la intervenci\u00F3n de la Reserva Federal de los Estados Unidos. El fondo cerr\u00F3 a comienzos de 2000."@es . . . . "\u30ED\u30F3\u30B0\u30BF\u30FC\u30E0\u30AD\u30E3\u30D4\u30BF\u30EB\u30DE\u30CD\u30B8\u30E1\u30F3\u30C8\uFF08\u82F1\u8A9E\uFF1ALong-Term Capital Management\u3001\u7565\u79F0\uFF1ALTCM\uFF09\u306F\u30011994\u5E74\u304B\u30891999\u5E74\u307E\u3067\u5B58\u5728\u3057\u305F\u30D8\u30C3\u30B8\u30D5\u30A1\u30F3\u30C9\u3002 \u304B\u3064\u3066\u30B3\u30CD\u30C1\u30AB\u30C3\u30C8\u5DDE\u306B\u672C\u90E8\u3092\u304A\u3044\u3066\u3044\u305F\u3002\u904B\u7528\u30C1\u30FC\u30E0\u306B\u30CE\u30FC\u30D9\u30EB\u7D4C\u6E08\u5B66\u8CDE\u53D7\u8CDE\u8005\u3089\u3092\u96C6\u3081\u3001\u9AD8\u5EA6\u306A\u91D1\u878D\u5DE5\u5B66\u7406\u8AD6\u3092\u99C6\u4F7F\u3057\u3066\u3001\u7D44\u6210\u304B\u3089\u6570\u5E74\u306F\u9A5A\u7570\u7684\u306A\u6210\u7E3E\u3092\u8A18\u9332\u3057\u305F\u3002\u3057\u304B\u3057\u53D6\u5F15\u50B5\u5238\u306E\u308F\u305A\u304B\u306A\u91D1\u5229\u5DEE\u304B\u3089\u53CE\u76CA\u3092\u5F97\u308B\u305F\u3081\u306B\u5DE8\u5927\u306A\u30EC\u30D0\u30EC\u30C3\u30B8\u3092\u304B\u3051\u3066\u3044\u305F\u305F\u3081\u3001\u30A2\u30B8\u30A2\u901A\u8CA8\u5371\u6A5F\u306E\u7D50\u679C\u8D77\u304D\u305F\u5E02\u5834\u306E\u5927\u5909\u52D5\u3092\u5438\u53CE\u3057\u304D\u308C\u305A\u7834\u7DBB\u3057\u305F\u3002"@ja . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "InternetArchiveBot"@en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "Long-Term Capital Management"@es . . . . . . . . .