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- In the case of deceit, it is far from clear that the underlying action independent of intention – the conveyance of a falsehood – is something that persons have libertarian rights against. Neither self ownership nor property ownership imply rights to not receive false information. One exception occurs in special cases where a party has explicitly contracted to receive information. Though promising, this solution cannot succeed. It is based on the idea that information is a good like any other that can be transferred between persons. However, if this is so, then exchanges of information are also subject to deceitfully obtained consent. Just as A might lie about the car's condition in order to obtain B's consent to a transaction she would not otherwise have consented to, A might lie about the properties of the information he is providing in the no-fraud clause that is intended to solve the fraud problem. Of course B could then try to contract against A's selling him a fraudulent contract, but by now it should be clear that this strategy is subject to a vicious regress. (en)
- One can also argue that whether the sale is a legal offense depends upon whether Ethan knew the truth and intentionally exaggerated the qualities of his product: did he intentionally lie, or did he make an honest mistake? Does it matter? Rothbard would probably say no. Consider again his remark: "Surely legality or illegality should depend not on the motivation of the actor, but on the objective nature of the act. If an action is objectively non-invasive, then it should be legal regardless of the benevolent or malicious intentions of the actor" . (en)
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