In game theory, a stochastically stable equilibrium is a refinement of the evolutionarily stable state in evolutionary game theory, proposed by and Peyton Young. An evolutionary stable state S is also stochastically stable if under vanishing noise the probability that the population is in the vicinity of state S does not go to zero.
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