LogicLocker, is a cross-vendor ransomware worm that targets Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS). First described in a research paper released by the Georgia Institute of Technology, the malware is capable of hijacking multiple PLCs from various popular vendors. The researchers, using a water treatment plant model, were able to demonstrate the ability to display false readings, shut valves and modify Chlorine release to poisonous levels using a Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 and an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400 PLC. The ransomware is designed to bypass weak authentication mechanisms found in various PLCs and lock out legitimate users while planting a logicbomb into the PLC. As of 14 February 2017, it is noted that there are over 1,4
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- LogicLocker (en)
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| - LogicLocker es un ransomware que afecta a los Controladores lógicos programables (PLC) utilizados en los Sistemas de control industrial (ICS). Descrito por primera vez en un documento de investigación publicado por el Instituto de Tecnología de Georgia, el malware es capaz de secuestrar múltiples PLC de varios proveedores populares. Los investigadores, utilizando un modelo de planta de tratamiento de agua, pudieron demostrar la capacidad de mostrar lecturas falsas, cerrar válvulas y modificar la liberación de cloro a niveles venenosos utilizando un Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 y un PLC Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400. El ransomware está diseñado para eludir los mecanismos de autenticación débiles que se encuentran en varios PLC y bloquear a los usuarios legítimos al plant (es)
- LogicLocker, is a cross-vendor ransomware worm that targets Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS). First described in a research paper released by the Georgia Institute of Technology, the malware is capable of hijacking multiple PLCs from various popular vendors. The researchers, using a water treatment plant model, were able to demonstrate the ability to display false readings, shut valves and modify Chlorine release to poisonous levels using a Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 and an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400 PLC. The ransomware is designed to bypass weak authentication mechanisms found in various PLCs and lock out legitimate users while planting a logicbomb into the PLC. As of 14 February 2017, it is noted that there are over 1,4 (en)
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| - LogicLocker es un ransomware que afecta a los Controladores lógicos programables (PLC) utilizados en los Sistemas de control industrial (ICS). Descrito por primera vez en un documento de investigación publicado por el Instituto de Tecnología de Georgia, el malware es capaz de secuestrar múltiples PLC de varios proveedores populares. Los investigadores, utilizando un modelo de planta de tratamiento de agua, pudieron demostrar la capacidad de mostrar lecturas falsas, cerrar válvulas y modificar la liberación de cloro a niveles venenosos utilizando un Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 y un PLC Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400. El ransomware está diseñado para eludir los mecanismos de autenticación débiles que se encuentran en varios PLC y bloquear a los usuarios legítimos al plantar una bomba lógica en el PLC. A partir del 14 de febrero de 2017, se observa que hay más de 1,400 de los mismos PLC utilizados en el ataque de prueba de concepto a los que se podía acceder desde Internet como se encontraron utilizando Shodan. (es)
- LogicLocker, is a cross-vendor ransomware worm that targets Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) used in Industrial Control Systems (ICS). First described in a research paper released by the Georgia Institute of Technology, the malware is capable of hijacking multiple PLCs from various popular vendors. The researchers, using a water treatment plant model, were able to demonstrate the ability to display false readings, shut valves and modify Chlorine release to poisonous levels using a Schneider Modicon M241, Schneider Modicon M221 and an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1400 PLC. The ransomware is designed to bypass weak authentication mechanisms found in various PLCs and lock out legitimate users while planting a logicbomb into the PLC. As of 14 February 2017, it is noted that there are over 1,400 of the same PLCs used in the proof-of-concept attack that were accessible from the internet as found using Shodan. (en)
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