About: Bishop–Cannings theorem

Facets (new session)
Description
Metadata
Settings
- Rule:
- Inverse Functional Properties:
- "Same As":

About: Bishop–Cannings theorem Goto Sponge NotDistinct Permalink

An Entity of Type : yago:WikicatEconomicsTheorems, within Data Space : dbpedia.org associated with source document(s)
QRcode icon

http://dbpedia.org/describe/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fdbpedia.org%2Fresource%2FBishop%E2%80%93Cannings_theorem

The Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff (Theorem 2), and (ii) that none of these can also be a pure ESS (from their Theorem 3). The usefulness of the results comes from the fact that they can be used to directly find ESSes algebraically, rather than simulating the game and solving it by iteration. The logic of (i) also applies to Nash equilibria (all strategies in the support of a mixed strategy receive the same payoff).

Attributes	Values
rdf:type	yago:WikicatBiologicalTheorems yago:Abstraction100002137 yago:Communication100033020 yago:Message106598915 yago:Proposition106750804 yago:Statement106722453 yago:Theorem106752293 yago:WikicatEconomicsTheorems
rdfs:label	Bishop–Cannings theorem (en)
rdfs:comment	The Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff (Theorem 2), and (ii) that none of these can also be a pure ESS (from their Theorem 3). The usefulness of the results comes from the fact that they can be used to directly find ESSes algebraically, rather than simulating the game and solving it by iteration. The logic of (i) also applies to Nash equilibria (all strategies in the support of a mixed strategy receive the same payoff). (en)
dcterms:subject	Biological theorems Evolutionary game theory Economics theorems
Wikipage page ID	3164527 (xsd:integer)
Wikipage revision ID	903634084 (xsd:integer)
Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage	Nash equilibrium Biological theorems Theorem Algebra Evolutionary game theory Iteration John Maynard Smith Evolutionary game theory Economics theorems Sheffield University Evolution and the Theory of Games Evolutionarily stable strategy Simulating dbr:Chris_Cannings dbr:Tim_Bishop_(genetic_epidemiologist)
sameAs	Bishop–Cannings theorem Bishop–Cannings theorem Bishop–Cannings theorem Bishop–Cannings theorem
dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate	dbt:Citation_needed dbt:Gametheory-stub
has abstract	The Bishop–Cannings theorem is a theorem in evolutionary game theory. It states that (i) all members of a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) have the same payoff (Theorem 2), and (ii) that none of these can also be a pure ESS (from their Theorem 3). The usefulness of the results comes from the fact that they can be used to directly find ESSes algebraically, rather than simulating the game and solving it by iteration. The logic of (i) also applies to Nash equilibria (all strategies in the support of a mixed strategy receive the same payoff). The theorem was formulated by and at Sheffield University, who published it in 1978. A review is given by John Maynard Smith in Evolution and the Theory of Games, with proof in the appendix. (en)
gold:hypernym	Theorem
prov:wasDerivedFrom	wikipedia-en:Bishop–Cannings_theorem?oldid=903634084&ns=0
page length (characters) of wiki page	1669 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger)
foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf	wikipedia-en:Bishop–Cannings_theorem
is Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage of	Bishop-Cannings theorem List of theorems
is Wikipage redirect of	Bishop-Cannings theorem
is foaf:primaryTopic of	wikipedia-en:Bishop–Cannings_theorem

Faceted Search & Find service v1.17_git139 as of Feb 29 2024

Alternative Linked Data Documents: ODE Content Formats:

RDF

ODATA

Microdata

About

OpenLink Virtuoso version 08.03.3330 as of Mar 19 2024, on Linux (x86_64-generic-linux-glibc212), Single-Server Edition (378 GB total memory, 54 GB memory in use)
Data on this page belongs to its respective rights holders.
Virtuoso Faceted Browser Copyright © 2009-2024 OpenLink Software