About: Self-confirming equilibrium

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In game theory, self-confirming equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium for extensive form games, in which players correctly predict the moves their opponents make, but may have misconceptions about what their opponents would do at information sets that are never reached when the equilibrium is played. Informally, self-confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that if a game is played repeatedly, the players will revise their beliefs about their opponents' play if and only if they observe these beliefs to be wrong.

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rdf:type	yago:Abstraction100002137 yago:Attribute100024264 yago:Equilibrium113934900 yago:Situation113927383 yago:State100024720
rdfs:label	自己確証均衡 (ja) Self-confirming equilibrium (en)
rdfs:comment	In game theory, self-confirming equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium for extensive form games, in which players correctly predict the moves their opponents make, but may have misconceptions about what their opponents would do at information sets that are never reached when the equilibrium is played. Informally, self-confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that if a game is played repeatedly, the players will revise their beliefs about their opponents' play if and only if they observe these beliefs to be wrong. (en) ゲーム理論において自己確証均衡 (じこかくしょうきんこう，self-confirming equilibrium) とは，展開型ゲームにおけるナッシュ均衡概念のひとつの一般化であって，そこではプレーヤーは相手が実際にとる行動を正しく予測するが，均衡で決して到達しない情報集合において相手が何をしたであろうかということについては思い違いをしているかもしれないようなものである．平たく言うと，自己確証均衡は，「もしゲームが繰りかえしプレーされるときにプレーヤーたちが相手のプレーについての信念を改訂していくとしたら，それは，自分の信念が誤ったものだと気づいたからにほかならない」というアイデアに動機づけられている． (ja)
name	Self-confirming equilibrium (en)
dcterms:subject	Game theory equilibrium concepts
Wikipage page ID	16961891 (xsd:integer)
Wikipage revision ID	992617123 (xsd:integer)
Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage	Nash equilibrium David K. Levine Game theory Drew Fudenberg Game theory equilibrium concepts Econometrica Information set (game theory) Extensive-form game Solution concept Rationalizability Extensive form game
sameAs	Self-confirming equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium
subsetof	Rationalizability
supersetof	Nash equilibrium
usedfor	Extensive-form games (en)
dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate	dbt:Cite_journal dbt:Infobox_equilibrium dbt:Game_theory dbt:Gametheory-stub
discoverer	Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine (en)
has abstract	In game theory, self-confirming equilibrium is a generalization of Nash equilibrium for extensive form games, in which players correctly predict the moves their opponents make, but may have misconceptions about what their opponents would do at information sets that are never reached when the equilibrium is played. Informally, self-confirming equilibrium is motivated by the idea that if a game is played repeatedly, the players will revise their beliefs about their opponents' play if and only if they observe these beliefs to be wrong. Consistent self-confirming equilibrium is a refinement of self-confirming equilibrium that further requires that each player correctly predicts play at all information sets that can be reached when the player's opponents, but not the player herself, deviate from their equilibrium strategies. Consistent self-confirming equilibrium is motivated by learning models in which players are occasionally matched with "crazy" opponents, so that even if they stick to their equilibrium strategy themselves, they eventually learn the distribution of play at all information sets that can be reached if their opponents deviate. (en) ゲーム理論において自己確証均衡 (じこかくしょうきんこう，self-confirming equilibrium) とは，展開型ゲームにおけるナッシュ均衡概念のひとつの一般化であって，そこではプレーヤーは相手が実際にとる行動を正しく予測するが，均衡で決して到達しない情報集合において相手が何をしたであろうかということについては思い違いをしているかもしれないようなものである．平たく言うと，自己確証均衡は，「もしゲームが繰りかえしプレーされるときにプレーヤーたちが相手のプレーについての信念を改訂していくとしたら，それは，自分の信念が誤ったものだと気づいたからにほかならない」というアイデアに動機づけられている．整合的自己確証均衡 (consistent self-confirming equilibrium) は，自己確証均衡の精緻化であって，そこでは各プレーヤーは，自分じしんを除く相手プレーヤーが均衡戦略から逸脱したときに到達しうるすべての情報集合について，プレーを正しく予測している，という追加的制約を要請するものである．整合的自己確証均衡は，プレーヤーたちがときおり「気が狂った」対戦相手にあたるという学習モデルに動機づけられており，この均衡では，自分たちの均衡戦略に固執したとしても最終的には，対戦相手の逸脱によって到達しうるすべての情報集合におけるプレーの確率分布を学習するようになっている． (ja)
gold:hypernym	Generalization
prov:wasDerivedFrom	wikipedia-en:Self-confirming_equilibrium?oldid=992617123&ns=0
page length (characters) of wiki page	1770 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger)
foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf	wikipedia-en:Self-confirming_equilibrium
is Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage of	Game theory Thomas J. Sargent Information set (game theory) Extensive-form game Rationalizability
is foaf:primaryTopic of	wikipedia-en:Self-confirming_equilibrium

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