About: Fact–value distinction

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The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between: 1. * 'Statements of fact' ('positive' or 'descriptive statements'), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method. 2. * 'Statements of value' ('normative' or 'prescriptive statements'), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology. This barrier between 'fact' and 'value' implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter.

Attributes	Values
rdf:type	yago:WikicatConceptualDistinctions yago:Abstraction100002137 yago:BasicCognitiveProcess105701944 yago:Cognition100023271 yago:Concept105835747 yago:Content105809192 yago:Differentiation105748285 yago:Discrimination105748054 yago:Idea105833840 yago:Process105701363 yago:PsychologicalFeature100023100 award yago:WikicatPhilosophicalConcepts
rdfs:label	Fact–value distinction (en) Distinction fait-valeur (fr)
rdfs:comment	La distinction fait-valeur est au cœur des débats épistémologiques sur la possibilité de l'objectivité dans les sciences. Elle recoupe partiellement la distinction entre énoncés descriptifs et prescriptifs, sans toutefois nécessairement coïncider avec celle-ci. (fr) The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between: 1. * 'Statements of fact' ('positive' or 'descriptive statements'), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method. 2. * 'Statements of value' ('normative' or 'prescriptive statements'), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology. This barrier between 'fact' and 'value' implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter. (en)
dcterms:subject	Value (ethics) Belief Conceptual distinctions Epistemology
Wikipage page ID	1440536 (xsd:integer)
Wikipage revision ID	1119294473 (xsd:integer)
Link from a Wikipage to another Wikipage	Cardinal virtues Moralistic fallacy David Hume Value (ethics) John Searle Belief An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding Max Weber Nature Epistemological Friedrich Nietzsche G. E. Moore Moral realism Thomas Hobbes Aristotelianism Empiricism Baden School Axiology Thus Spoke Zarathustra A Treatise of Human Nature Alasdair MacIntyre Ethics Normative Norwood Russell Hanson Positive statement Reason Hilary Putnam Is–ought problem Teleology Arthur Prior Arts Conceptual distinctions Epistemology Aesthetics John Locke Martin Heidegger Philippa Foot Philosophers Philosophical Positivism Social science Four Causes Ruth Anna Putnam Moral philosophy Naturalistic fallacy Relativism Non-overlapping magisteria Normative statement Theory-ladenness Physical observation Empirical method Capital vices Pragmatists
Link from a Wikipage to an external page	https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315457932
sameAs	Fact–value distinction Fact–value distinction Fact–value distinction Fact–value distinction Fact–value distinction
dbp:wikiPageUsesTemplate	dbt:ISBN dbt:Main dbt:More_citations_needed dbt:Quote dbt:Reflist dbt:Short_description dbt:Wiktionary dbt:Epistemology dbt:Jurisprudence dbt:Philosophy_of_science
date	September 2017 (en)
talk	Citations needed (en)
has abstract	The fact–value distinction is a fundamental epistemological distinction described between: 1. * 'Statements of fact' ('positive' or 'descriptive statements'), based upon reason and physical observation, and which are examined via the empirical method. 2. * 'Statements of value' ('normative' or 'prescriptive statements'), which encompass ethics and aesthetics, and are studied via axiology. This barrier between 'fact' and 'value' implies it is impossible to derive ethical claims from factual arguments, or to defend the former using the latter. The fact–value distinction is closely related to, and derived from, the is–ought problem in moral philosophy, characterized by David Hume. The terms are often used interchangeably, though philosophical discourse concerning the is–ought problem does not usually encompass aesthetics. (en) La distinction fait-valeur est au cœur des débats épistémologiques sur la possibilité de l'objectivité dans les sciences. Elle recoupe partiellement la distinction entre énoncés descriptifs et prescriptifs, sans toutefois nécessairement coïncider avec celle-ci. (fr)
gold:hypernym	Distinction
prov:wasDerivedFrom	wikipedia-en:Fact–value_distinction?oldid=1119294473&ns=0
page length (characters) of wiki page	13581 (xsd:nonNegativeInteger)
foaf:isPrimaryTopicOf	wikipedia-en:Fact–value_distinction

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