. . "In philosophy and religion the passions are the instinctive, emotional, primitive drives in a human being (including, for example, lust, anger, aggression and jealousy) which a human being must restrain, channel, develop and sublimate in order to be possessed of wisdom. In religion and philosophy the same way of grasping passion does not always apply. The philosophical notion of passion, in contrast, is identified with innate or biologically driven emotional states regarded in ancient philosophies and the great religions as being the basis for deadly sins and seen as leading to various social and spiritual ills such as unstable relationships, broken marriages, lack of social integration, psychological disorders and other problems. In the philosophical tradition of the West passion is often placed in opposition to reason. Reason is advocated in the control of passion, something seen as desirable and necessary for the development of a mature, civilized human being. This is achieved by the cultivation of virtue. Four virtues in particular have long been seen as of especial value in this regard. The majority of philosophies and religions advocate at the very least tempering the passions to keep them within acceptable bounds. However most of the great religions recommend both the restraint and the transformation of the passions to the point where they no longer arise. This is true of Christianity, Jainism, Buddhism, Islam and Hinduism. The institution of the monastery within various religions is a means by which human beings may temporarily or permanently seclude themselves from circumstances exacerbating the arising of passion and provide a supportive environment for doing spiritual work. Contemporary philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger has developed a view of the passions that disassociates them from human nature, and instead gives them a formless life that serve in our noninstrumental dealings with each other. Rather than the guiding force behind our relations with the world, they organize and are organized around the need and danger that is at the heart of our relations with each other. In this way, Unger rejects the traditional view of the passions as something counter to reason and which are associated with certain expressions, rather he sees them at the service of reason and their expression formed within certain contexts."@en . . . . . . . "Dans son sens philosophique, plus large que le sens courant, la passion, du latin patior, pati, homonyme grec \u03C0\u03AC\u03B8\u03BF\u03C2 (pathos) , signifiant la \u00AB souffrance \u00BB, le \u00AB supplice \u00BB, l'\u00AB \u00E9tat de celui qui subit \u00BB, d\u00E9signe l'ensemble des pulsions instinctives, \u00E9motionnelles et primitives de l'\u00EAtre humain qui, lorsqu'elles sont suffisamment violentes, entravent sa capacit\u00E9 \u00E0 r\u00E9fl\u00E9chir et \u00E0 agir de mani\u00E8re raisonn\u00E9e. Elle est diff\u00E9rente des connotations actuelles populaires de la passion qui tendent \u00E0 la restreindre \u00E0 un sentiment d'attirance irraisonn\u00E9 voire obsessionnel envers une personne (passion amoureuse), un objet, un loisir ou un concept. Les concepts des passions et de l'impact des effets sur le corps sont tr\u00E8s anciens, d\u00E9j\u00E0 \u00E9tudi\u00E9s dans l'Antiquit\u00E9 grecque et r\u00E9actualis\u00E9s par Descartes. Leur \u00E9tude est par exemple tr\u00E8s d\u00E9velopp\u00E9e dans le sto\u00EFcisme qui accorde une place centrale \u00E0 la raison et pr\u00F4ne ainsi la ma\u00EEtrise, voire l'extinction des passions (apatheia), comme une condition indispensable pour atteindre le bonheur. La notion philosophique est identifi\u00E9e par des \u00E9tats \u00E9motionnels sensiblement per\u00E7us, comme la col\u00E8re, la luxure, proche de celle qu'on trouve dans la religion."@fr . . "Passione (filosofia)"@it . "Dans son sens philosophique, plus large que le sens courant, la passion, du latin patior, pati, homonyme grec \u03C0\u03AC\u03B8\u03BF\u03C2 (pathos) , signifiant la \u00AB souffrance \u00BB, le \u00AB supplice \u00BB, l'\u00AB \u00E9tat de celui qui subit \u00BB, d\u00E9signe l'ensemble des pulsions instinctives, \u00E9motionnelles et primitives de l'\u00EAtre humain qui, lorsqu'elles sont suffisamment violentes, entravent sa capacit\u00E9 \u00E0 r\u00E9fl\u00E9chir et \u00E0 agir de mani\u00E8re raisonn\u00E9e. Elle est diff\u00E9rente des connotations actuelles populaires de la passion qui tendent \u00E0 la restreindre \u00E0 un sentiment d'attirance irraisonn\u00E9 voire obsessionnel envers une personne (passion amoureuse), un objet, un loisir ou un concept. Les concepts des passions et de l'impact des effets sur le corps sont tr\u00E8s anciens, d\u00E9j\u00E0 \u00E9tudi\u00E9s dans l'Antiquit\u00E9 grecque et r\u00E9actualis\u00E9s par Descartes. Leur"@fr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "1124666925"^^ . . "Passione, dal greco antico \u03C0\u03AC\u03B8\u03BF\u03C2 (p\u00E0thos) cio\u00E8 sofferenza o passivit\u00E0, in filosofia indica il predicato o la categoria dell'essere corrispettivo e complementare all'azione alla quale logicamente si oppone.."@it . . "20045233"^^ . . . "Passion (philosophie)"@fr . . "In philosophy and religion the passions are the instinctive, emotional, primitive drives in a human being (including, for example, lust, anger, aggression and jealousy) which a human being must restrain, channel, develop and sublimate in order to be possessed of wisdom. In religion and philosophy the same way of grasping passion does not always apply. The philosophical notion of passion, in contrast, is identified with innate or biologically driven emotional states regarded in ancient philosophies and the great religions as being the basis for deadly sins and seen as leading to various social and spiritual ills such as unstable relationships, broken marriages, lack of social integration, psychological disorders and other problems. In the philosophical tradition of the West passion is often"@en . . . "7190"^^ . . . . . . . . . . . "Passione, dal greco antico \u03C0\u03AC\u03B8\u03BF\u03C2 (p\u00E0thos) cio\u00E8 sofferenza o passivit\u00E0, in filosofia indica il predicato o la categoria dell'essere corrispettivo e complementare all'azione alla quale logicamente si oppone.."@it . . . . "Passions (philosophy)"@en .