Any phenomenon can be explained by a multiplicity of hypothesis. How, then, can data ever be sufficient to prove a theory? This is the epistemological problem of the indeterminacy of data to theory.
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| - Any phenomenon can be explained by a multiplicity of hypothesis. How, then, can data ever be sufficient to prove a theory? This is the epistemological problem of the indeterminacy of data to theory.
The poverty of the stimulus argument and W.V.O. Quine (1960) 'Gavagai' example are perhaps the most commented variants of the epistemological problem of the indeterminacy of data to theory. (en)
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| - Any phenomenon can be explained by a multiplicity of hypothesis. How, then, can data ever be sufficient to prove a theory? This is the epistemological problem of the indeterminacy of data to theory. (en)
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| - Epistemological problem of the indeterminacy of data to theory (en)
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