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- The Asymmetry, also known as 'the Procreation Asymmetry', is the idea in population ethics that there is a moral or evaluative asymmetry between bringing into existence individuals with good or bad lives. It was first discussed by Jan Narveson in 1967, and Jeff McMahan coined the term 'the Asymmetry' in 1981. McMahan formulates the Asymmetry as follows: "while the fact that a person's life would be worse than no life at all ... constitutes a strong moral reason for not bringing him into existence, the fact that a person's life would be worth living provides no (or only a relatively weak) moral reason for bringing him into existence." Professor Nils Holtug formulates the Asymmetry evaluatively in terms of the value of outcomes instead of in terms of moral reasons. Holtug's formulation says that "while it detracts from the value of an outcome to add individuals whose lives are of overall negative value, it does not increase the value of an outcome to add individuals whose lives are of overall positive value." Much of the literature on the ethics of procreation deals with the Asymmetry. A number of authors have defended the Asymmetry, and a number of authors have argued against it. Many who defend the asymmetry appeal to its intuitiveness. However, more elaborated defences of the asymmetry have been yielded. For instance, Jan Narveson argues that: If we cause a miserable child to come into existence, there will exist a child who will have a justified complaint, while if we refrain from causing a happy child to come into existence, this child will not exist and so can have no complaint. Against Narverson's argument, Timothy Sprigge has claimed that if we give a miserable child a genuine reason to complain by bringing her into existence we also give a happy child a genuine reason to be grateful. Professor Sprigge's argument highlights that Narveson's claim does not explain why the future of the miserable child is special but the future of the happy child is not special in the same way. Parfit solves this issue by holding these views: (1) appeal to the Person-affecting Restriction, (2) claim that causing someone to exist can be either good or bad for him, and (3) appeal to the Narrow Principle. According to the Narrow Principle, it is wrong, if other things are equal, to do what would be either bad for, or worse for, the people who ever live. It is therefore wrong to have the Wretched Child, since this would be bad for him. But it is in no way wrong to fail to have the Happy Child. The Narrow principle justifies Narveson's defence of the asymmetry. However, this has been contested. For instance, Nils Holtug holds that the asymmetry is incompatible with a person-affecting solution to the nonidentity problem and, in addition, it is counterintuitive in another case. Suppose that in the future the last inhabitants of the earth can populate the world again or refrain from procreating and thus bring an end to the human race. Whatever they do, these already existing individuals will be equally happy. Even if they could bring billions of happy individuals into existence, there would surely be a few of them whose existence would be miserable and, hence, given the asymmetry they should bring about the end of the human race since the happiness of those possible billions of individuals counts for nothing compared to the suffering of those who would have miserable lives.To avoid this radical separation between happiness and suffering, Holtug appeals instead to the Weak Asymmetry: Everything else being equal, it is better to avoid that a person comes into existence and has a life worth not living (at level –n), than to ensure that a person comes into existence and has a life worth living (at level n). This allows to give extra weight to the badness of bringing miserable lives into existence but also allows to outweight small quantities by much larger ones when comparing suffering and happiness. (en)
- Die Asymmetrie ist in der angewandten Ethik ein Paar naiver moralischer Überzeugungen, die das Erzeugen von Personen betreffen. Texte zur Asymmetrie beginnen typischerweise mit der Beobachtung, dass ausgehend vom Common Sense gesagt werden könne, dass es zwar einerseits so etwas wie „eine Pflicht gibt, die Existenz leidender Personen zu verhindern, aber keine entsprechende Pflicht oder Tugend, die Existenz glücklicher Personen zu bedingen“. Mit anderen Worten und etwas formaler besteht „die Asymmetrie“ aus den folgenden moralischen Überzeugungen: 1.
* „Die Aussicht auf ein Leben einer Person, die absolut miserabel dran wäre – jenseits der Schwelle eines lebenswerten Lebens – gilt als ein Grund, die Existenz dieser Person zu verhindern.“ 2.
* „Die Aussicht auf ein Leben einer Person, deren Leben ein gutes und lebenswertes Leben wäre, gilt allein nicht als ein Grund dafür, die Existenz dieser Person zu bedingen.“ Was es genau bedeutet, dass ein Leben (nicht mehr) als lebenswert oder als (k)ein gutes Leben gilt, ist typischerweise nicht Gegenstand der Diskussionen um die Asymmetrie. Es geht vielmehr um die scheinbare Eigenart, wie bei diesem Typ von Entscheidungen einerseits die Aussicht auf ein Übel einen guten Grund gegen eine Handlung liefert; die Aussicht auf ein scheinbar vergleichbares Gut aber keinen Grund für eine scheinbar vergleichbare Handlung darstellt. (de)
- La Asimetría en el ámbito de la ética de la población, también conocida como "Asimetría de la Procreación" es la idea de que existe una asimetría moral o evaluativa entre la existencia de individuos con vidas "buenas" o "malas". El tema fue discutido por primera vez por Jan Narveson en 1967 y Jeff McMahan acuñó el término "Asimetría" 1981. McMahan formula la Asimetría de la siguiente manera: "aunque el hecho de que la vida de una persona sería peor que no tener vida en absoluto [...] constituye una fuerte razón moral para no hacerlo existir. El hecho de que la vida de una persona merezca la pena no es (o solo es una razón moral relativamente débil) para traerlo a la existencia ". El profesor Nils Holtug formula la Asimetría evaluativa en términos del valor de los resultados en lugar de hacerlo en términos de razones morales. La formulación de Holtug dice que "si bien disminuye el valor de un resultado para agregar individuos cuyas vidas tienen un valor global negativo, no aumenta el valor de un resultado para sumar individuos cuyas vidas tienen un valor global positivo". Mucha de la literatura sobre la ética de la procreación está relacionada con este término de Asimetría. Un gran número de investigadores han defendido el término, y algunos otros han debatido en contra. (es)
- A assimetria, também conhecida como a assimetria da procriação, é uma ideia na ética populacional de que existe uma assimetria moral ou evaluativa entre trazer à existência indivíduos com uma vida boa ou má. Ela foi discutida pela primeira vez por Jan Narveson em 1967, e Jeff McMahan cunhou o termo "a Assimetria" em 1981. McMahan formula a Assimetria da seguinte forma: "enquanto o fato de que a vida de uma pessoa seria pior do que ela não ter nascido... constitui uma forte razão moral para não trazê-la à existência, o fato de que a vida de uma pessoa valeria a pena ser vivida, não fornece nenhum (ou apenas um relativamente fraco) motivo moral para trazê-la à existência." O professor Nils Holtug formula a Assimetria em forma de avaliação, em termos do valor dos resultados, em vez de em termos de razões morais. A formulação de Holtug diz que "enquanto adicionar indivíduos cujas vidas seriam de valor geral negativo diminui o valor de um resultado, adicionar indivíduos cujas vidas são de um valor positivo geral não aumenta valor de um resultado". Muito da literatura sobre a ética da procriação lida com a Assimetria. Alguns autores têm defendido a Assimetria, e outros têm argumentado contra ela. (pt)
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- The Asymmetry, also known as 'the Procreation Asymmetry', is the idea in population ethics that there is a moral or evaluative asymmetry between bringing into existence individuals with good or bad lives. It was first discussed by Jan Narveson in 1967, and Jeff McMahan coined the term 'the Asymmetry' in 1981. McMahan formulates the Asymmetry as follows: "while the fact that a person's life would be worse than no life at all ... constitutes a strong moral reason for not bringing him into existence, the fact that a person's life would be worth living provides no (or only a relatively weak) moral reason for bringing him into existence." Professor Nils Holtug formulates the Asymmetry evaluatively in terms of the value of outcomes instead of in terms of moral reasons. Holtug's formulation says (en)
- Die Asymmetrie ist in der angewandten Ethik ein Paar naiver moralischer Überzeugungen, die das Erzeugen von Personen betreffen. Texte zur Asymmetrie beginnen typischerweise mit der Beobachtung, dass ausgehend vom Common Sense gesagt werden könne, dass es zwar einerseits so etwas wie „eine Pflicht gibt, die Existenz leidender Personen zu verhindern, aber keine entsprechende Pflicht oder Tugend, die Existenz glücklicher Personen zu bedingen“. Mit anderen Worten und etwas formaler besteht „die Asymmetrie“ aus den folgenden moralischen Überzeugungen: (de)
- La Asimetría en el ámbito de la ética de la población, también conocida como "Asimetría de la Procreación" es la idea de que existe una asimetría moral o evaluativa entre la existencia de individuos con vidas "buenas" o "malas". Mucha de la literatura sobre la ética de la procreación está relacionada con este término de Asimetría. Un gran número de investigadores han defendido el término, y algunos otros han debatido en contra. (es)
- A assimetria, também conhecida como a assimetria da procriação, é uma ideia na ética populacional de que existe uma assimetria moral ou evaluativa entre trazer à existência indivíduos com uma vida boa ou má. Ela foi discutida pela primeira vez por Jan Narveson em 1967, e Jeff McMahan cunhou o termo "a Assimetria" em 1981. McMahan formula a Assimetria da seguinte forma: "enquanto o fato de que a vida de uma pessoa seria pior do que ela não ter nascido... constitui uma forte razão moral para não trazê-la à existência, o fato de que a vida de uma pessoa valeria a pena ser vivida, não fornece nenhum (ou apenas um relativamente fraco) motivo moral para trazê-la à existência." O professor Nils Holtug formula a Assimetria em forma de avaliação, em termos do valor dos resultados, em vez de em term (pt)
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