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- Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M. Nixon administration during the Vietnam War, as a result of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive, to "expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. " This referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in the ground combat role, but did not reject combat by U.S. air forces, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of U.S. foreign military assistance organizations. U.S. citizens′ mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai (1969), the invasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers (1971). After Nixon's election in 1968, Vietnamization became the policy of the United States. While it was a deliberate policy, the name was rather accidental. At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the National Security Council, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close. Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, agreed with the point, but not with the language: "what we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues. " Nixon immediately liked Laird's word. Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration detente policy, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism, but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically "realists" in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U.S. -Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin, with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation. In like manner, Nixon opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam, which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence. Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. " The first was achievable, but it would take time. For the U.S. , it was trivial to have a U.S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel. As observed by LTG Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months-long training, and then additional field time to become proficient. In other words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years. Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."
- A vietnamizálás az az amerikai politikai döntés, illetve katonai folyamat volt a vietnami háborúban, amelynek értelméáben a konfliktusban részvevő amerikai katonák feladatait teljes egészében a dél-vietnami kormánycsapatoknak kellett (volna) átvenniük. Richard Nixon elnök már választási kampányában is hangoztatta az amerikai csapatok fokozatos és lassú kivonulását Vietnamból. Hivatalba lépése után célja a Vietnami Köztársasági Hadsereg olyan megerősítése volt, hogy az egyedül is képes legyen felvenni a harcot és megvívni a háborút a Dél-Vietnami Nemzeti Felszabadítási Fronttal és az észak-vietnami hadsereggel. Ez a stratégia lett az úgynevezett Nixon-doktrína alapja. A vietnamizálás kimondatlan célja az amerikai csapatok tehermentesítése és ezzel az amerikai háborúellenes érzelmek tompítása volt. Nixon 1969 nyarán megkezdte az amerikai csapatok kivonását, és 1973-ban az utolsó amerikai katona is elhagyta Dél-Vietnamot. A vietnamizálás első nagy próbája, amelyben a dél-vietnami erőknek önállóan – bár amerikai tüzérségi és légi támogatás mellett – kellett felvenniük a harcot az ellenséggel, 1971. február 8-án kezdődött, amikor a dél-vietnami csapatok a Lam Son 719 hadművelet során behatoltak Laosz területére is, hogy elvágják a Ho Si Minh-ösvényt. A hadművelet nem érte el a kitűzött célokat, és az óriási kudarc amellett, hogy feltárta a dél-vietnami hadsereg gyengéit, bizalmatlanságot is szült az dél-vietnami vezetésben és lakosságban az amerikaiakkal szemben. Sokan közülük úgy gondolták, hogy a vietnamizálás nem más, mint az ő feláldozásuk a háborúban. Az amerikai csapatkivonás rövid időn belül Dél-Vietnam katonai és politikai összeomlásához vezetett.
- ベトナミゼーション、ベトナマイゼーション（英語: Vietnamization） 通常は、制度や風習などをベトナムのようにする行為を指す。 外交政策では、ベトナム戦争の最中にリチャード・ニクソン米国大統領が計画した、ベトナムからの撤退戦略を指す。この場合は、後の時代になって「アフガニスタンのベトナム化」、「イラクのベトナム化」という使い方がされる場合がある。
- Vietnamização foi uma política da administração do presidente dos Estados Unidos Richard Nixon, como resultado da Ofensiva do Tet, para "ampliar, equipar e treinar as forças do Vietnã do Sul e atribuir-lhes cada vez mais um papel de combate, ao mesmo tempo com uma redução gradual do número de tropas de combate dos EUA. " Isto se referia às tropas de combate norte-americanas especificamente no papel de combate terrestre, mas não rejeitava o combate pelas forças aéreas norte-americanas, bem como o apoio ao Vietnã do Sul, em consonância com as políticas de organizações estrangeiras de assistência militar aos EUA. A desconfiança do governo que havia começado após a Ofensiva do Tet e piorou com a divulgação de notícias sobre soldados norte-americanos massacrando civis em My Lai, a invasão do Camboja e o vazamento dos Pentagon Papers. Após a eleição de Nixon em 1968, tornou-se a política dos Estados Unidos. Embora tenha sido uma política deliberada, seu nome foi bastante acidental. Numa reunião em 28 de janeiro de 1969, do Conselho de Segurança Nacional, o Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, o deputado Gen. Creighton Abrams, o comandante do Comando de Militar Assistência do Vietnã, afirmou que o Exército da República do Vietnam tinha vindo a melhorar, e o ponto em que a guerra poderia ser "desamericanizada" estava próximo. Melvin Laird, o secretário de Defesa, concordou com o ponto, mas não com a linguagem: "O que precisamos é de um termo como 'Vietnamização" para colocar em ênfase as questões certas. " Nixon gostou imediatamente da palavra de Laird.. A Vietnamização se encaixa na política mais ampla da distensão da Administração Nixon, em que os Estados Unidos deixaram de considerar entre suas estratégias fundamentais como a contenção do comunismo, mas uma ordem mundial de cooperação em que Nixon e seu chefe conselheiro Henry Kissinger eram basicamente os "realistas" nos assuntos mundiais, interessados na mais ampla constelação de forças e as maiores potências . Nixon tinha ordenado a Kissinger que negociasse política básica entre os chefes de Estado EUA-URSS via Henry Kissinger e Dobrynin, com os acordos em seguida, transferidos para os diplomatas para a implementação. Da mesma forma, Nixon abriu contacto de alto nível com a China. As relações dos EUA com a União Soviética e a China eram vistos por muito como mais importante que o destino do Vietnã do Sul, o que certamente não exclui o Vietnã do Sul de manter a sua própria independência. Nixon afirmou que a vietnamização teve dois componentes. O primeiro foi o "fortalecimento da força armada do Vietnã do Sul em números, equipamento, liderança e habilidades de combate. O segundo componente foi a extensão do programa de pacificação no Vietnã do Sul". O primeiro era possível, mas levaria tempo..
- Вьетнамизация — название политики администрации Никсона в отношении войны во Вьетнаме, сформулированной в 1969 году.
- Việt Nam hóa chiến tranh hay Đông Dương hóa chiến tranh là chiến lược của chính quyền Hoa Kỳ dưới thời Tổng thống Richard Nixon trong Chiến tranh Việt Nam, được bắt đầu từ năm 1968, áp dụng toàn diện trên toàn Đông Dương từ ngày 8 tháng 6 1969 nhằm từng bước chuyển trách nhiệm tiến hành chiến tranh cho chính quyền và quân đội Sài Gòn để Mỹ có thể rút dần quân về nước nhưng vẫn giữ được miền Nam Việt Nam, và cả bán đảo Đông Dương trong tầm ảnh hưởng của Mỹ.
- Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M. Nixon administration during the Vietnam War, as a result of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive, to "expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. " This referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in the ground combat role, but did not reject combat by U.S. air forces, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of U.S. foreign military assistance organizations. U.S. citizens′ mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai (1969), the invasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers (1971). After Nixon's election in 1968, Vietnamization became the policy of the United States. While it was a deliberate policy, the name was rather accidental. At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the National Security Council, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close. Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, agreed with the point, but not with the language: "what we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues. " Nixon immediately liked Laird's word. Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration détente policy, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism, but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically "realists" in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U.S. -Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin, with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation. In like manner, Nixon opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam, which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence. Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. " The first was achievable, but it would take time. For the U.S. , it was trivial to have a U.S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel. As observed by LTG Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months-long training, and then additional field time to become proficient. In other words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years. Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."
- Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M. Nixon administration during the Vietnam War, as a result of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive, to "expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. " This referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in the ground combat role, but did not reject combat by U.S. air forces, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of U.S. foreign military assistance organizations. U.S. citizens′ mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai (1968), the invasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers (1971). After Nixon's election in 1968, Vietnamization became the policy of the United States. While it was a deliberate policy, the name was rather accidental. At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the National Security Council, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close. Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, agreed with the point, but not with the language: "what we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues. " Nixon immediately liked Laird's word. Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration détente policy, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism, but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically "realists" in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U.S. -Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin, with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation. In like manner, Nixon opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam, which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence. Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. " The first was achievable, but it would take time. For the U.S. , it was trivial to have a U.S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel. As observed by LTG Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months-long training, and then additional field time to become proficient. In other words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years. Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."
- Vietnamization was a policy of the Richard M. Nixon administration during the Vietnam War, as a result of the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive, to "expand, equip, and train South Vietnam's forces and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. combat troops. " This referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in the ground combat role, but did not reject combat by U.S. air forces, as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of U.S. foreign military assistance organizations. U.S. citizens′ mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiers massacring civilians at My Lai (1968), the invasion of Cambodia (1970), and the leaking of the Pentagon Papers (1971) which gave aids to all the people of the world, even YOU! You dont know it yet, but dont worry, its there. I would go to the doctor soon or you might DIE! HAHAHAHAHAHA!!! Loser!. After Nixon's election in 1968, Vietnamization became the policy of the United States. While it was a deliberate policy, the name was rather accidental. At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the National Security Council, GEN Andrew Goodpaster, deputy to GEN Creighton Abrams, commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close. Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, agreed with the point, but not with the language: "what we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues. " Nixon immediately liked Laird's word. Vietnamization fit into the broader Nixon Administration détente policy, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as containment of Communism, but a cooperative world order in which Nixon and his chief adviser Henry Kissinger were basically "realists" in world affairs, interested in the broader constellation of forces, and the biggest powers. Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate basic U.S. -Soviet policy between the heads of state via Kissinger and Dobrynin, with the agreements then transferred to diplomats for implementation. In like manner, Nixon opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China were seen as far more important than the fate of South Vietnam, which certainly did not preclude South Vietnam maintaining its own independence. Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam. " The first was achievable, but it would take time. For the U.S. , it was trivial to have a U.S. helicopter pilot fly in support, but helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel. As observed by LTG Dave Palmer, to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed months of English language training to be able to follow the months-long training, and then additional field time to become proficient. In other words, adding new capabilities to the ARVN would often take two or more years. Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."
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