Aumann's agreement theorem, informally stated, says that two people acting rationally (in a certain precise sense) and with common knowledge of each other's beliefs cannot agree to disagree. More specifically, if two people are genuine Bayesians with common priors, and if they each have common knowledge of their individual posteriors, then their posteriors must be equal. Of course, the assumption of common priors is a rather strong one and may not hold in practice.
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- Aumann's agreement theorem, informally stated, says that two people acting rationally (in a certain precise sense) and with common knowledge of each other's beliefs cannot agree to disagree. More specifically, if two people are genuine Bayesians with common priors, and if they each have common knowledge of their individual posteriors, then their posteriors must be equal. Of course, the assumption of common priors is a rather strong one and may not hold in practice. However, Robin Hanson has presented an argument that Bayesians who agree about the processes that gave rise to their priors (e.g. , genetic and environmental influences) should, if they adhere to a certain pre-rationality condition, have common priors.
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- Aumann's agreement theorem, informally stated, says that two people acting rationally (in a certain precise sense) and with common knowledge of each other's beliefs cannot agree to disagree. More specifically, if two people are genuine Bayesians with common priors, and if they each have common knowledge of their individual posteriors, then their posteriors must be equal. Of course, the assumption of common priors is a rather strong one and may not hold in practice.
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- Aumann's agreement theorem
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