Pacto Anticomintern
Pacte Anti-Komintern
Antikominternpakt
방공 협정
Anti-Comintern Pact
Pakt antykominternowski
防共協定
Антикоминтерновский пакт
Σύμφωνο Αντικομιντέρν
حلف مناهضة الكومنترن
Pakta Anti-Komintern
Pakt proti Kominterně
Antikominternpakten
Антикомінтернівський пакт
Antikominterna pakto
Patto anticomintern
反共產國際協定
Anti-Kominternpact
Antikomintern Ituna
Pacto Antikomintern
Pacte anti-Komintern
Пакт против Коммунистического Интернационала, организован Германией и Японией в 1936 году
II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan önce Almanya ile Japonya arasında kurulan pakt
ברית בין מדינות
dohoda mezi Německem a Japonskem
1936年德国-日本条约
Völkerrechtlicher Vertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und dem Japanischen Kaiserreich
pacte entre l'Allemagne nazie et l'Empire du Japon avant la Seconde Guerre mondiale
pact dintre Germania și Japonia în cel de-Al Doilea Război Mondial
pact between Nazi Germany and Japan prior to World War II
mednarodna pogodba med Nemškim rajhom in Japonskim cesarstvom
二国間条約
Saksan ja Japanin välinen sopimus
artikel daftar Wikimedia
alleanza internazionale contro l'Internazionale Comunista
μεσοπολεμική αντικομμουνιστική συνθήκη συνεργασίας μεταξύ της ναζιστικής Γερμανίας και της Ιαπωνίας
The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Govemment, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defence against Communist subversion; have agreed as follows Article 1: The High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures and to carry these through in close collaboration. Article 2: The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement. Article 3: The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the further methods of their cooperation.
The Anti-Comintern Pact itself should be limited in its phraseology and should refer only to an exchange of information against the subversive activities of the Comintern. To include more than the foregoing in the pact would anger and alarm the Soviet Union unnecessarily and would provide other countries with an opportunity for engaging in propaganda activities against us. [...] Japanese-German collaboration must not be a cause of anxiety to any other powers, especially Britain. Anglo-Japanese relations are not friendly at present because of the China question and certain economic issues that cannot be adjusted as yet, but one of the keynotes of our foreign policy must be to improve our relations with Britain, which has substantial influence with other world powers, and we must at the very least avoid a face-to-face confrontation with it at all costs.
The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the Government of the U.S.S.R. is working toward a realization of the aims of the Communist International and intends to employ its army for this purpose; convinced that this fact threatens not only the existence of the High Contracting States, but endangers world peace most seriously; in order to safeguard their common interests have agreed as follows: Article 1: Should one of the High Contracting States become the object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the U.S.S.R., the other High Contracting State obligates itself to take no measures which would tend to ease the situation of the U.S.S.R. Should the case described in paragraph 1 occur, the High Contracting States will immediately consult on what measures to take to safeguard their common interests. Article 2: For the duration of the present agreement the High Contracting States will conclude no political treaties with the U.S.S.R. contrary to the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent. Article 3: The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. The agreement comes into force simultaneously with the agreement against the Communist International signed today and will remain in force for the same period.
The Soviet Union's revolutionary pressure on Asia increases as it continues to strengthen its national defense and international position through a huge rearmament program. Its goal, a Red penetration of many areas, interferes with Japan's East Asia policy and poses a grave threat to our empire's defense. Thwarting the Soviet Union's aggressive intention therefore has become the most crucial element in our diplomacy. This goal must be achieved by diplomatic means and by completion of a defense buildup. [...] Germany has interests that closely parallels ours vis-a-vis the Soviet Union because of the special arrangement that exists between Russia and France. Hence, it is in Germany's interest to cooperate with us; and we in turn should promote close relations with Germany, leading to alliance between Japan and Germany. This relationship must be expanded to include Poland and other friendly European countries near the Soviet Union as well as other Asian and Islamic countries, as a further restraint on the Soviet Union.
In the face of the war provocations of the German fascists and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments by the war parties in the capitalist countries [...] the central slogan of the Communist Parties must be: struggle for peace. All those interested in the preservation of peace should be drawn into this vital front. The concentration of forces against the chief instigators of war at any given moment constitutes a most important task of the Communist Parties.
Cooperative diplomacy will not solve the present emergency, which is not an isolated incident but represents a world emergency that has come about despite the great efforts that have been made by all countries since the World War. Japan must take advantage of the glorious challenge posed by the Manchurian Incident and our withdrawal from the League of Nations. We must accept our fate, firmly refusing to be weakened by avoiding the challenge, and must have the courage to use this opportunity to formulate a great plan for our country's next hundred years.
Another development, hardly dangerous in itself, but portentous of things to come, was the conclusion of an Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan and Germany in November 1936. Though it was ostensibly a limited agreement for exchange of information and consultation concerning Communist subversion, it served to give a tangible basis for the belief that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were very much alike and linked together.
[T]he question arose as to how a way could be found at all to win over other countries to counter communistic tendencies. The problem, therefore, was an ideological one. In the year 1933, I believe, Hitler discussed with me for the first time, the question of whether a closer contact with Japan could be established in some form or other. I replied that I personally had certain connections with Japanese persons and would establish contact. When I did so it came to light that Japan had the same anti-Comintern attitude as Germany. Out of these conversations of the years 1933, 1934, 1935, I believe, the idea gradually crystallized that one might make these common efforts the subject of a pact. I believe it was one of my assistants who had the idea of concluding the Anti-Comintern Pact. I presented this idea to the Fuhrer and the Fuhrer approved of it. However, since it was, so to speak, an ideological question, he did not wish at that time that it be done through the official channels of German politics and therefore he instructed me to prepare this pact which then was concluded in my office in Berlin, as I believe, in the course of the year 1936.
On the occasion of the signing today of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows: a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the exchange of information over the activities of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International. b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities. c) In order to facilitate the cooperation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive adivities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.
Well-informed people refuse to believe that for the drawing of the two scanty published articles of the German-Japanese agreement it was necessary to conduct negotiations for fifteen months, and that on the Japanese side it was necessary to entrust these negotiations to an Army general, and on the German side to an important diplomat, and that it was necessary to conduct these negotiations in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy. As regards the published [...] agreement, it is only a camouflage for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initially [...] in which the word 'Communism' is not even mentioned.
The onward march of fascism was underlined by the anti-comintern pact concluded between Germany and Japan in November 1936, to combat the spread of communist regimes. It was ostensibly directed against the USSR, but the seemingly close relations established between the two governments also posed a serious threat to the British empire. This threat was magnified when Italy adhered to the pact in late 1937.
Ian Kershaw: Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis. . p. 27.
Presseisen, Ernst L. . Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. . p. 328.
Presseisen, Ernst L. . Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. . p. 327.
MGFA: The Build-up of German Aggression . . p. 639.
Paul W. Schroeder: The Axis Alliance and Japanese-American Relations 1941 . . p. 7.
Ohata, Tokushiro . "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William . "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 12. .
Stratman, George John . Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941. Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2450. University of Montana. p. 18.
German Federal Archives. 1937 – 1941 ; Die Kriegsjahre; 6 : 15. September bis 11. Dezember 1941. Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945 aus dem Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes . D-13,2. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht. pp. 671–672.
Ohata, Tokushiro . "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William . "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 31. .
Stratman, George John . "The Anti-Comintern Pact 1933–1936". Germany's diplomatic relations with Japan 1933–1941. Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2450. University of Montana. p. 26.
Ruth Henig: The Origins of the Second World War 1933–1941. . p. 30.
Presseisen, Ernst L. . Germany and Japan: A Study in Totalitarian Diplomacy 1933–1941. Den Haag: Springer-Science + Business Media. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-6590-9. . pp. 327–328.
Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. 10. Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal. 1947. p. 240.
Ohata, Tokushiro . "The Anti-Comintern Pact, 1935–1939". In Morley, James William . "Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany and the USSR, 1935–1940". p. 32 & 39. .
Ian Kershaw, 2000
Text of the Secret Additional Protocol to the German-Japanese Agreement [25 Nov 1936]
Supplementary Protocol [to the German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International] [25 Nov 1936]
Ribbentrop's testimony regarding the Anti-Comintern Pact's creation
Italian entry protocol
"The Essence of National Defense and Proposals to Strengthen It"
Ruth Henig, 1985
Paul W. Schroeder, 1958
Manfred Messerschmidt, 1990
"The Foreign Policy of Imperial Japan"
Seventh World Congress declaration regarding the threat of Germany and Japan
The German-Japanese Agreement against the Communist International [25 Nov 1936]
Pact
right
Japanese ambassador to Germany Kintomo Mushanokōji and the German ambassador-at-large Joachim von Ribbentrop sign the Anti-Comintern Pact.
Initial parties
---- Before World War II
China ]]
---- During World War II